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MEANINGFUL CHOICE: A HISTORY OF CONSENT AND
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CONSENT MYTH
Charlotte A. Tschider*
Although the first legal conceptions of commercial privacy were
identified in Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s foundational
1890 article, The Right to Privacy, conceptually, privacy has existed
since as early as 1127 as a natural concern when navigating
between personal and commercial spheres of life. As an extension
of contract and tort law, two common relational legal models, U.S.
privacy law emerged to buoy engagement in commercial enterprise,
borrowing known legal conventions like consent and assent.
Historically, however, international legal privacy frameworks
involving consent ultimately diverged, with the European Union
taking a more expansive view of legal justification for processing as
alternatives to consent.
Unfortunately, consent as a procedural substitute for individual
choice has created a number of issues in achieving legitimate and
effective privacy protections for Americans. The problems with
consent as a proxy for choice are well known. This Article explores
the twin history of two diverging bodies of law as they apply to the
privacy realm, then introduces the concept of legitimate interest
balancing as an alternative to consent. Legitimate interest analysis
requires an organization to formally assess whether data collection
and use ultimately result in greater benefit to individuals than the
organization with input from actual consumers. This model shifts
responsibility from individual consumers having to protect their
*
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own interests to organizations that must engage in fair data use
practices to legally collect and use data. Finally, this Article
positions the model in relation to common law, federal law, Federal
Trade Commission activities, and judicial decision-making as a
means for separating good-intentioned organizations from
unethical ones.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Informational privacy law, both as a consumer concern and as a
civil right, has a history that spans as long as organized society has
existed. Indeed, the first notions of privacy are recorded as early as
1127.1 Aristotle defined the polis (gr: πόλις), or the political and
public realm, from the oikos (gr: οἶϰος), the private realm, where a
person’s individual realm existed, the idia (gr: ἴδια).2 Since this time,
philosophers have identified a separation between public and private
life and, indeed, the negotiation between these two realms, as a
central human experience.3
In 17th Century Europe, economic participation moved from the
personal to a more dynamic, public participation in the market, or
commercial economics, Kommerzienwirtschaft.4 By the 18th
century, finance and agricultural technology were separating from
traditional economics, and private spheres of civil society became
connected to public authority.5 The relationship between public
commercial activity and private life began to influence
understanding of these spheres, their connectivity, and their overlap.
Within small communities, unauthorized disclosures of health
information specifically became a concern when sensitive
information was shared with others in the community.6
1
JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY LAW, ETHICS, AND THE
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 9 (1997) [hereinafter DECEW]. See also JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY
GERMAN SOCIAL THOUGHT) 3 (Thomas Burger trans., 1991) [hereinafter
HABERMAS].
2
See DECEW, supra note 1, at 10.
3
Id. at 10–13.
4
HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 20.
5
Id.
6
See Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law,
PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, PLI 17 (2006), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=20
76&context=faculty_publications [https://perma.cc/94JQ-9MDQ] (quoting
Simonsen v. Swensen, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920), in which the court identified a
“wrong” and recognized damages for loss of confidentiality). In Simonsen, the
Nebraska Supreme Court noted that confidentiality within a physician and patient
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By the time the first populations settled U.S. colonies, the legal
concept of privacy was only beginning to develop, and privacy was
a luxury usually experienced by wealthy individuals.7 Large homes
accommodated physical privacy and etiquette training discouraged
reading others’ private communications, while having less
economic means usually involved sharing private spaces.8 At the
time, most people did not trust the privacy of mail communications
and instead communicated by cipher or other code.9 The United
Kingdom’s Post Office Act of 1710 created the first statutory
recognition of privacy and levied a fine for postmasters opening
private communications, which was recognized in the early
colonies.10 Despite this, during the American Revolution both sides
regularly opened their adversary’s communications.11
In 18th Century Colonial America, privacy was often considered
a negative, rather than a positive.12 Those who expected privacy
could not be readily observed by neighbors, which was necessary
for communities prior to centralized policing.13 In small
communities, observation by neighbors supported a kind of
self-governance, an early form of the surveillance-privacy
tradeoff.14 Privacy was a “source of tension” both because of an
increasing interest in personal privacy and a conflicting interest in
community monitoring, or surveillance.15 From the outset, privacy
was a nuanced and complex concept.
relationship improves outcomes and treatment, a public good. See, e.g., Humphers
v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985) (discussing the variety
of circumstances giving rise to physician’s liability for disclosing confidential
information, including by express or factual implication).
7
Cathy Hellier, Physical, Intellectual, Biographical: Our Idea of Privacy and
Their Evolution, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG (2013), https://research.
colonialwilliamsburg.org/foundation/journal/winter13/privacy.cfm
[https://perma.cc/Q8SH-9RV5].
8
Id. Although not addressed in this paper, privacy protection still favors those
who can afford it.
9
Id.
10
Id. The Post Office Revenues Act of 1710, 9 Ann. c.10 (Gr. Brit.).
11
See Hellier, supra note 7.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
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The specific privacy roots and motivations of the United States
and Europe in the 20th century had very different origins. In 1890,
future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and attorney Samuel
Warren penned The Right to Privacy, which focused on the
commercialization of individuals in the news media including
newspaper photojournalists seeking sensational and tawdry
information, especially about famous individuals.16 Notably, three
of the four invasion of privacy torts identified in the famous piece
are related to commercialization—appropriation, unreasonable
publicity, and false light (what would become libel).17 It is likely that
the concept of “personal information” as a potential risk for
individuals was simply not on the radar, before the development of
computers and broad-scale personal information use.
Today’s privacy world is dramatically different than the world
of Warren and Brandeis. Data are collected, retained, transferred,
duplicated, and analyzed, sometimes by humans, sometimes by
artificially intelligent algorithms.18 Quality and reliable data are
tremendously valuable—and are used for nearly every service,
whether simply to provide service, enhance service, measure
performance, or to increase adoption of a service.19

16

Benjamin E. Bratman, The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to
Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002).
17
Id.
18
Charlotte A. Tschider, Deus ex Machina: Regulating Cybersecurity and
Artificial Intelligence for Patients of the Future, 5 SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 183–
84 (2018) [hereinafter Tschider, Deus ex Machina]; Charlotte A. Tschider,
Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in
the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87, 109 (2018) [hereinafter
Tschider, Regulating]; Charlotte A. Tschider, AI’s Legitimate Interest: Towards
a Public Benefit Privacy Model for Healthcare Data, HOUST. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y (forthcoming, 2021) [hereinafter Tschider, AI’s Legitimate] (describing the
value of data in sectors like healthcare for a variety of artificial intelligence
applications).
19
See Hugo Moreno, The Importance of Data Quality – Good, Bad Or Ugly,
FORBES (June 5, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2017/06/05/
the-importance-of-data-quality-good-bad-or-ugly/?sh=507a90fb10c4
[https://perma.cc/S3DA-RGCV]; Anne W. Branscomb, Global Governance of
Global Networks: A Survey of Transborder Data Flow in Transition, 36 VAND.
L. REV. 985, 987 (1983).
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One key problem, however, is that in transactions, providing
personal information is a condition of service, and an individual
supplies this information after having an opportunity to read a
privacy notice and consent to it. On its face, notice and consent
appears to be a manifestation of individual knowledge and
subsequent choice. In reality, the notice/consent model is fraught
with a variety of issues, originally posed by Daniel Solove, that have
been well established in recent writings.20
Although privacy scholars have admired the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), few U.S. scholars have discussed
the origins of consent in U.S. and EU law, in order to identify the
function and purpose of this convention.21 Fewer still have analyzed
the impact of alternatives to consent, including legitimate interest, a
justification for data collection and processing that involves
balancing interests of an organization with interests of the individual
about whom data are collected.22 This model reflects inherent
20

See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital
Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1479 (2019) (describing the challenges of
consent in the United States); Charlotte A. Tschider, The Consent Myth:
Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH. U.L. REV. 1505, 1519
(2019) [hereinafter Tschider, The Consent Myth] (describing the challenges of
contemporary consent in healthcare in the United States). See generally Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1880, 1880 (2013) (describing the consent dilemma and calling for more
discussion of consent’s problems). This article aims to clearly articulate the
history and function of consent from U.S. and European perspectives, while
building on previously identified issues with notice and consent.
21
Mike Hintze has discussed privacy statements and their purpose but has not
explored the finer details of alternative lawful bases for processing under the
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). Mike Hintze, Privacy Statements
under the GDPR, 42 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1129 (2019) (describing the many
requirements to meet GDPR privacy statement [notice] requirements).
22
Elettra Bietti has explored the dominating “free pass” of consent and
introduces the alternative bases available under the GDPR. Elettra Bietti, Consent
as a Free Pass: Platform Power and the Limits of the Informational Turn, 40
PACE L. REV. 314, 338. As Bietti remarks, in the case studies evaluated within
Bietti’s article, specifically the CNIL v. Google case, no alternative lawful bases
for processing existed: only consent. Id. at 344. Legitimate interest is largely a
convention of EU law, one that has not been discussed in relation to U.S. law,
especially in a comparative manner. Rather, much of its discussion has occurred
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notions of decision-making under the common law, including
relativity and reasonableness while simultaneously promoting
fairness in data processing behaviors.23
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the history
of consent in the United States to illustrate why consent is the
preferred model for privacy frameworks in the United States, while
illustrating why relational models are inherent in these transactions
and worth building upon. Part III describes the history of consent in
the EU, including the evolution to multiple forms of lawful bases for
personal information processing from consent-based models. Part
in the EU. See generally Federico Ferretti, Data Protection and the Legitimate
Interest of Data Controllers: Much ado About Nothing or the Winter of Rights?,
51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 843 (2014) (describing the role of legitimate interest
as an expansive lawful basis); Paolo Balboni, Daniel Cooper, Rosario Imperiali,
Milda Macenaite, Legitimate Interest of the Data Controller New Data Protection
Paradigm: Legitimacy Grounded on Appropriate Protection, 3 INT’L DATA PRIV.
L. 244 (2013) (describing legitimate interest as a new paradigm); Irene Kamara &
Paul De Hert, Understanding the Balancing Act Behind the Legitimate Interest of
the Controller Ground: A Pragmatic Approach, 4 BRUSSELS PRIV. HUB 1 (2018)
(exploring how to create a usable legitimate interest model); Mark J. Taylor &
Tess Whitton, Public Interest, Health Research and Data Protection Law:
Establishing a Legitimate Trade-off between Individual Control and Research
Access to Health Data, 9 L. 1 (2020) (describing the benefits of data access);
Dolenc Dubravka, Legitimate Interest as Legal Grounds for Processing Personal
Data, 49 BANKARSTVO 145 (2020) (discussing legitimate interest under the GDPR
as a valid lawful basis); Michael Veale, Reuben Binns & Jef Ausloos, When Data
Protection by Design and Data Subject Rights Clash, 8 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 105
(2018) (explaining the differences between user rights and data use under privacy
by design). These scholars all individually have described challenges and
solutions related to the concept of legitimate interest in the European Union and
individual member states. Fred Cate first discussed a “public interest” with respect
to the EU Data Protection Directive in his piece, as early as 1995. Fred Cate, The
EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80
IOWA L. REV. 431, 441 (1995). In it, Cate describes the contours of the Data
Protection Directive, which informed later global laws and the General Data
Protection Regulation. Id. Cate briefly introduced the tension between the value
of information and privacy protections that supports the “public interest,” though
this concept was not defined more fully into the concept of “legitimate interest.”
Id. at 441–42.
23
Luke Irwin, The GDPR: Legitimate Interest- What is it and When Does it Apply?,
IT GOVERNANCE BLOG (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.itgovernance.eu/blog/en/the-gdprlegitimate-interest-what-is-it-and-when-does-it-apply [https://perma.cc/PB8Z-E9C6].
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IV draws upon philosophy and previous scholarly works to illustrate
how consent does not adequately meet existing privacy needs,
proposing instead a relational model which imposes more
responsibility on organizations in a superior position to understand
risk to data subjects.
II. CONSENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The law in the United States developed, at least initially, through
judicial decision-making in the common law. Over time, the
intersection of public and private life, and a need to safely traverse
these different spheres, resulted in the development of privacy torts
and recognized commercial obligations in contract.24 As data
became more important for specific sectors, and the risks to
individuals became higher, specific sectors developed privacy laws
to minimize potential risk to individuals and instill trust in these
systems.25 These laws took the form of federal laws, largely
managed by administrative agencies, then spurred state law
developments where federal laws did not regulate.26
As a key point of difference between the United States and the
European Union, the United States does not have a common,
broadly applicable, omnibus privacy law that creates obligations for
organizations and individuals.27 Privacy law developed from early
24

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Strahilevitz, Contracting
over Privacy: Introduction, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (2016) (describing the law and
economics of contracting related to privacy, including privacy notices); Alicia
Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law
Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J. 614 (2018) (advocating for a return
from sectoral privacy laws to the common law).
25
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 448 (2016). Indeed, “trust is a state of mind
that enables its possessor to be willing to make herself vulnerable to another.” Id.,
at 448 n. 61. For sectors where trust is of utmost importance, and,
correspondingly, fiduciary relationships also inure, Congress has recognized the
need for privacy commitments. However, much requires such commitments
outside narrow sectoral legislation.
26
See CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER, INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY & PRIVACY
LAW IN PRACTICE 26 (2018).
27
Id.
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tort law and contract law, eventually growing though accretion of
federal sectoral laws and state laws. Consent, therefore, has roots in
all of these bodies of law in the United States. Unfortunately, for
most of these bodies of law, consent is not actually effective in
representing individual choice, as will be described in more detail in
Part IV.
A. Consent in Tort Law
Most modern notions of privacy, outside embedded notions in
the Constitution related to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments,
originate from common law tort, originally identified in the oft-cited
The Right to Privacy by Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis.28
Warren and Brandeis’s privacy torts stemmed, at least in part, from
a lack of agreement to share or make public something private, “a
psychological or spiritual interference caused by the unconsented to
collection and publication of personal information,” a negative
freedom.29 This negative freedom presumably included its reciprocal
freedom, an “affirmative capacity” for decisions on disclosure of
private information about an individual’s life.30
Early privacy torts in the United States, therefore, sought to
secure personal autonomy through affirmative decision-making, or
choice. Warren and Brandeis expressly linked affirmative
decision-making with the concept of consent, referencing consent
no less than eighteen times, though privacy torts were concerned
with different problems at the time.31 Although grouped as “privacy
torts,” rights to publicity and invasion of privacy serve different
purposes and flow from different legal concepts. Rights to publicity,
for example, flow from contractual principles of unjust enrichment,
28

See Solove, supra note 6, at 5. The tort as a “wrong,” provides an interesting
conceptual framework for evaluating privacy obligations and lack thereof in
comparison to contractual relationships where breach of contract does not
evidence a wrong. Privacy in the United States, as an evolution from both tort and
contract law, falls somewhere in between. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24.
29
Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV.
1, 16 (1979). Although Professor Glancy describes this as control, control here is
used not as a legal term, but as language used to represent the ability to make
decisions about information privacy or disclosure.
30
Id. at 24.
31
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, 193–20.
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whereas the second is more core to Warren and Brandeis’s original
argument.32
The first common law privacy tort statutes were enacted in
response to Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.33 New York
passed the first invasion of privacy tort in 1903, and Georgia
followed with recognition of an invasion of privacy tort in Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co.34 Even in the Warren and Brandeis era,
certain sectors, like health care, remained a local, non-commercial
service, which did not enjoy much protection under the Warren and
Brandeis tort definitions.35 Perhaps overt recognition of privacy in
financial relationships and health care relationships resulted from
the highly personal and community-based aspect of these services
at the time. Consent emerged as this proxy through the historically
dominant arms of the common law, tort law, and contract law, which
in many ways created a procedural proxy.36
32

Id., at 199–200 (analogizing to written works as protected and valuable).
Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902).
34
See Glancy, supra note 29, at 13; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50
S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
35
Although grouped as “privacy torts,” rights to publicity and invasion of
privacy serve different purposes and flow from different legal concepts. Rights to
publicity, for example, flow from contractual principles of unjust enrichments,
whereas the second is more core to Warren and Brandeis’s original argument.
Harry Kavlan, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law – Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966).
36
See infra, Part II and accompanying notes. In this way, consent preceded
privacy legally and conceptually; consent therefore is foundational to many
different legal disciplines including privacy law. Herein, this Author hopes to
more fully illustrate the reasons why consent alone cannot serve as a proxy for
individual choice. Indeed, society expects consent to do far too much by way of
securing individual autonomy and representing broader consumer choice. Daniel
J. Solove has previously noted the expectations and limitations of consent and the
natural tension between free enterprise “choice” for consumers and paternalistic
(statutory) privacy obligations. See Solove, supra note 20, at 1880. See also Daniel
J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY,
PLI, 2006, at 5 (2006), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2076&context=faculty_publi
cations [https://perma.cc/5E8J-CJMP]; Kavlan Jr., supra note 35, at 331. See also
Glancy, supra note 29, at 16. Although Professor Glancy describes this as control,
control here is used not as a legal term, but as language used to represent the
33
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Yet, a full recognition of positive privacy rights did not develop,
except in limited cases, where the common law recognized these
freedoms and provided a means of recovery. States that have
recognized privacy torts such as intrusion upon seclusion,
appropriation of name or likeness (right of publicity), invasion of
privacy, public disclosure of private facts, and false light temper
these torts with a recognized affirmative defense of consent or
agreement.37 This analytically follows: if individuals consent to their
name or likeness being used, share private facts publicly, agree to
be portrayed inaccurately, or invite the public into their private
affairs, they cannot later argue that another party has intentionally
engaged in tortious conduct and receive damages.38
Warren and Brandeis connected the right to be left alone to the
concept of consent as a defense to encroachment on privacy,
mentioning consent eighteen times, crucially in articulating
principles: “the right of privacy ceases upon the publication of the
facts by the individual, or with his consent.”39 In this way, Warren
ability to make decisions about information privacy or disclosure. The first
common law privacy torts were enacted in response to Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902), when New York passed the
first invasion of privacy tort in 1903. Georgia followed with recognition of an
invasion of privacy tort in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga.
1905). See Glancy, supra note 29, at 13.
37
See Glancy, supra note 29, at 14. William Prosser identified four distinct torts
in 1960, and most states today recognize some variation of these torts. William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Although consent is an available
affirmative defense for intentional torts, consent has been criticized for many of
the same reasons it is criticized in privacy law. Actual and apparent consent
loosely map to explicit and implicit consent, respectively. Although actual and
apparent consent are specific legal standards in battery, explicit and implicit
consent in privacy regulations illustrate both the regulatory standard and the
procedural mechanism for facilitating consent.
38
Public interests could weigh in favor of disclosure, even without consent.
First, publication of private information could serve a public or general interest,
support efficient adjudication within judicial or legislative proceedings, and may
be allowed when free speech rights are implicated. See Glancy, supra note 29, at
38.
39
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 218. Warren and Brandeis quote
Woosley v. Judd (1855): “[w]e must be satisfied, that the publication of private
letters, without the consent of the writer, is an invasion of an exclusive right of
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and Brandeis seem to present consent as a limiting factor, a variant
of commercial transaction with greater attendant meaning.
William Prosser built upon the Warren and Brandeis foundation,
standardizing intrusions on privacy resulting from non-trespassory
activities, such as wiretapping and Peeping Tom cases.40 However,
scholars around that time also criticized the formulation of such
torts, given their relative imprecision both in demonstrating a prima
facie case and in articulating potential damages.41 More
contemporary scholars, including Neil M. Richards and Daniel J.
Solove, have criticized the ineffectiveness of Prosser’s privacy torts
to remedy issues regarding collection, use, and dissemination.42
Despite the relative ineffectiveness of historically established
privacy torts, legally recognized confidential relationships have
continued to enjoy special protection under the law, creating a
narrow privacy protection for sensitive information.43 As early as
1849, English courts recognized a breach of confidentiality action
as a breach of “trust, confidence, or contract.”44 In 1894, a
property which remains in the writer, even when the letters have been sent to, and
are still in the possession of the correspondent.” Id. Courts did not recognize this
and other opinions often because contents of correspondence did not fit traditional
notions of personal property. See id. at 203. Consent was featured heavily in
relation to intentional privacy torts and articulated as a principle. Id. at 218.
40
William L. Prosser, supra note 37 at 389–406.
41
Id. at 334. One major concern regarded potential injuries without broad
recognition of emotional damages, as most privacy torts would implicate different
types of damages than successful tort actions traditionally award. “It remains odd
to give recovery for emotional disturbance without any showing that plaintiff
suffered or was upset.” Id.
42
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed
Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (2010) (describing Solove, Citron, Whitman,
and Friedman’s criticism of Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis’s privacy torts
as lacking the initial momentum to realize their potential and their subsequent
failure with new technology, including online environments).
43
The law often referenced these as fiduciary relationship, or special
relationships of trust, which create specific duties, including, frequently, a duty of
confidentiality as well as a duty of loyalty. See Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary
Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 14 (2020).
44
See G. Michael Harvey, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure
of Privacy, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 2385, 2396 (1992) (quoting Prince Albert v.
Strange, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 [Ch. 1849]).
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Massachusetts court identified a “violation of confidence” related to
duplication of private photographs.45
In the 1920s, a breach of confidence tort began to emerge in the
United States.46 However, most courts embraced the Warren and
Brandeis torts instead, stalling the development of breach of
confidentiality torts.47 Unlike broad confidentiality agreements,
which often focused on private information about an organization,
special relationships focused on a relationship of trust between two
parties, where information would be exchanged.48 The common law
breach of confidentiality tort required no explicit contractual
agreement, as these understandings were typically implied
contractual terms under a pre-existing contractual relationship.49 The
recent popularity of the breach of confidentiality tort likely extended
from a failure to establish an effective privacy tort for personal
information disclosure.50 As such, protection for narrowly defined
45

See id. at 2397 (quoting Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 [C.C.D. Mass.
1894]).
46
See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (recognizing
confidentiality obligations between a physician and his patient).
47
See Harvey, supra note 44, at 2398–99.
48
Specially defined confidential relationships, although between two natural
persons, extend to the organization of one of the natural persons, such as the
hospital rather than just the medical professional working with a given individual.
49
See Harvey, supra note 44, at 2400 n.79 (quoting Peterson v. Idaho Nat’l
Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961)) (describing the existence of an implied
term of an agreement not to disclose information related to a financial customer’s
account). Certainly, confidential relationships could (and often were)
memorialized via contract for clarity. However, the law generally does not require
existence of a confidentiality agreement, but rather only evidence that a
confidential relationship has formed for relationships traditionally bound by a
duty of confidentiality, namely professional relationships and those in which a
fiduciary duty exists. Id. at 2429 n.208. Increasingly, states require consent for
financial, medical, and other special relationships to expressly communicate the
professional’s obligation to the individual, although written notice and consent
were not originally required at common law.
50
Id. at 2413. The public disclosure of private facts tort does not effectively
protect two-party interests and district court attention has instead focused on
media defendants rather than professional service providers. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has focused on First Amendment values as they pertain to
information disclosure, especially the legitimate interest of the public in receiving
relevant information. This signals a similar approach to the lower courts.
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confidential relationships enjoyed a resurgence in popularity while
privacy torts have waned, despite Warren and Brandeis’s early
cautions.51
The concept of consent is not unique to privacy torts. Consent
has also provided an effective affirmative defense for other torts,
such as battery, although such a defense has raised considerable
questions over whether a lack of consent is also required to establish
a prima facie case.52 Although actual and apparent consent are
specific legal standards in battery, explicit and implicit consent in
privacy regulations illustrate both the regulatory standard and the
procedural mechanism for facilitating consent.53 When a defendant
establishes a reasonable belief that the plaintiff has consented, often
the defendant cannot be found to have “intended” to commit a
battery.54 Similarly, explicit consent processes facilitate active,
affirmative consent and provide evidence that an individual actively
consented to some further action in relation to personal information
(e.g., access, collection, transfer, sharing, aggregation, use, sale).55
Consent in this way acts as nearly a rebuttable presumption—when
an individual has consented to certain terms of a privacy notice, and
those terms are accurate, it is tremendously difficult to argue that an
invasion of privacy has occurred.56
What does this brief history of consent in torts indicate about
consent in the United States? First, it may suggest that consent has
51

See id. at 2399. Warren and Brandeis’s article contemplated a confidentialitybased approach to privacy law and ultimately rejected it on the grounds that it
might be too narrowly defined: confidence based on contract or special
confidence. See id. at 2398.
52
See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion
and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1627 (2012) (discussing consent as
part of intentional battery torts, including traditional battery and medical battery).
53
See id. at 1605.
54
Id.
55
See Jay Cline, Privacy Consent Glossary, IAPP (Sept. 1, 2009),
https://iapp.org/news/a/2009-09-privacy-consent-glossary/
[https://perma.cc/EW7R-N2NR].
56
This illustrates the difficulty of privacy torts: informational privacy is usually
subject to privacy notices or terms of use that were provided at some point in time.
This, then, creates an intersectionality of law between tort and contract in
commercial relationships and complicates clear legal direction in either of these
areas. See infra Part II (C) and accompanying notes.
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been positioned as a functional approximation of individual choice
for at least 120 years, potentially as far back as Ancient Greece,
serving as a means of navigating transitions between private and
public environments. Second, the U.S. reinforcement of consent as
a limiting factor for bringing a successful tort lawsuit (or at least the
option of an affirmative defense) showcases the tremendous
importance of consent in the U.S. legal system as a visible
approximation of individual choice, even when consent does not
lead to a positive result for the individual consenting. Finally, these
history-based, accretive conceptions of consent, combined with
broad solicitation of personal information in commercial
relationships, has led to consent’s intransigence in privacy law. As
this Article discusses in Part II, this intransigence does no favors for
actual consumers.
B. Contract Law: Consent as Accepting a Contract of Adhesion
Like tort law, contract law evolved over time to manage
exchanges of personal information via commercial contractual
relationships, though frequently personal information was a
condition of the broader contract itself.57 Variations of contractual
agreement, including contracts implied in fact and quasi contracts,
were recognized as early as Roman-era law and evolved as
commercial market participation increased.58 Under English law, the

57
Consider, for example, doctor-patient relationships, wherein a contract was
for medical care and identifiable health data was collected to fulfill the contract
in place. Or, for example, a construction contract where information about an
individual’s home address was used to ensure construction occurred at the right
location. In these cases, personal information was secondary or conditional within
the contract but not necessarily a material term of it.
58
J. B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1888),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1321512.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3PB-QW5T].
The concept of indebitus assumpsit was a variation of implied contract, in that a
contract was created to provide equitable remedy when the participation of two
parties evidenced some bargain without a contract. Id. However, this contract was
created precisely because something occurred that caused damage, impeding
performance of the implied contract. Id. This concept operates similar to tort in
that a party has undertaken a duty, yet the foundation for the duty is a contractualtype relationship.
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King recognized two types of contracts: covenant and debt.59 The
King’s courts focused heavily on debt, or when one party received
a benefit without giving value in return.60
Under the common law that eventually developed, agreement by
explicit memorialization, by implication of reciprocal promises, or
undertaking a responsibility, established a commitment between
two or more parties, often positioned as reciprocal promises.61 The
four requirements of contract at common law included: (1) parties
capable of contracting; (2) parties’ consent (either explicit or
implied); (3) a lawful object (or lawful subject matter); and (4) cause
or consideration.62
The growth of market conditions to include transfer of personal
information as part of commercial relationships likely introduced
the concept of consent in contract.63 Contracts, therefore, likely
resulted from a brokering of negotiating personal autonomy for
products and services when private life converged with commercial
enterprise, a blend of consent and offer acceptance. Indeed, all
59

See Timothy J. Sullivan, The Concept of Benefit in the Law of
Quasi-Contract, 64 GA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1975).
60
Id.
61
See Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished from Quasi Contract, 2
CAL. L. REV. 171, 172 (1914). Contracts are divided fairly simplistically into:
(1) explicit contract (memorialization); (2) implied in fact contract (no evidence
but action); and (3) implied by law (equitable remedy, applicable as in unjust
enrichment or indebitus assumpsit).
62
See id. Arguably, consent is a crucial and historical aspect of contract
formation, “the master concept that defines the law of contracts in the United
States.” See Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract
Law, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 57, 58–59 (2012). Contracts implied by fact
became implied contracts, or tacit contracts, while contracts implied by law
became quasi contracts. Both contract types were created as a protective measure:
if an explicit agreement does not exist, nevertheless value could be given (or
changed) which demonstrates the existence of such an agreement. See also
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985) (describing
contract claims and other relationships which give rise to an understanding of
confidentiality).
63
A topic that is still under discussion is the degree to which privacy notices
online will be, de facto, considered contracts wherein consent operates as assent
in traditional common-law contract. See Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy
Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45,
48 (2018).
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contractual “commitments are enforceable because the promisor has
‘willed’ or freely chosen to be bound by his commitment.”64 If
contracts are viewed as an exchange of consent, it is not a surprise
that consenting is the procedural method (either by overt action or
inaction) favored for supplying personal information in commercial
settings primarily governed by contracts.
Privacy interests involving consent usually include two parties
in a commercial relationship, with singular or repeat disclosures and
subsequent personal information management obligations.65 For
example, personal information might be provided in exchange for
access to an online service. However, for that online service to run
effectively, continuous information may need to be supplied. This
means that any relationship is governed in real time by the contract
and consent previously memorialized.66 Although the concept of
continuous service within a contract is not new or unusual,
especially between sophisticated parties, there are several concerns
when such a relationship involves disproportionate bargaining
power and a desire to change the terms without notice or
reconsenting.67
Privacy notices (to which an individual consents) are a hybrid of
two kinds of contracts: confidentiality agreements and traditional
contracts based on exchange of promises.68 For consumer contracts,
the commitments are somewhat asymmetrical, yet the role of
privacy is not usually an explicit promise made, though the
exchange of promises regarding data may not be part of the primary

64

Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 647, 650 (2012).
65
See Klass, supra note 63, at 57 (describing unilateral changes of privacy
notices, illustrating that the relationship between an organization and a consumer
is an ongoing one).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 52 (describing the one-sided aspect of adhesive bargaining, including
information asymmetries and unequal bargaining power).
68
Id. at 94 (explaining Loeffler v. The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., No. 2:06CV
0333 ECR LRL, 2006 WL 1796008 (D. Nev. June 28, 2006), wherein the Nevada
District Court described the relationship as one both of confidentiality and
contract).
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goods or services agreement.69 Take, for example, the following
excerpt from a modern privacy notice:
To provide the Facebook Products, we must process information about
you. The types of information we collect depend on how you use our
Products. You can learn how to access and delete information we collect
by visiting the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings. . . .
Information and content you provide. We collect the content,
communications and other information you provide when you use our
Products, including when you sign up for an account, create or share
content, and message or communicate with others. This can include
information in or about the content you provide (like metadata), such as
the location of a photo or the date a file was created. . . .
We use the information we have (subject to choices you make) as
described below and to provide and support the Facebook Products and
related services described in the Facebook Terms and Instagram
Terms. . . .
We’ll notify you before we make changes to this policy and give you the
opportunity to review the revised policy before you choose to continue
using our Products. . . .70

Importantly, in the example above, typical for most Privacy
Notices, Facebook only informs about what it does and what it will
do, rather than making any actual commitments. For example,
Facebook makes no commitments about safeguarding information
or limiting its activities with “will not” language. More than
anything, a Privacy Notice (or, indeed, a privacy section of a Terms
of Use) is informative rather than demonstrating any real
commitment. If consent is the procedure used to signal acceptance
of terms, the fact that no real commitment has been made casts doubt
on the enforceability of the contract itself.71
Despite some key differences between a traditional contract and
consenting to a privacy notice, and some question as to whether a
privacy notice is a contract, in the event such notices are interpreted
69

Id. at 50.
Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy [https://
perma.cc/9MYC-CGH6] (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
71
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981). It
should be noted that although privacy notices may be viewed by some courts as
contracts, this is not as overwhelming as previously believed. See Klass, supra
note 63, at 51 (challenging the ALI’s comment regarding privacy policies treated
by courts as contracts using case analysis and reproducing such results).
70
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as contracts, the common law may apply in important ways. First,
imperfections in the contracting process and inherent unfairness in
a contract’s terms certainly can render such agreements voidable via
the unconscionability doctrine.72 Unconscionability in most states
requires both substantive unconscionability, which could include
unfair terms (the “what”), and procedural unconscionability,
unfairness in how the contract is presented, communicated, or how
acceptance is induced (the “how”).73 This dual requirement often
makes it difficult to prove unconscionability for contracts of
adhesion (inherently one-sided contracts), commonly used for
privacy notices and terms of use agreements.74 Consent in this model
may objectively evidence acceptance but may not actually result in
autonomous choice. Furthermore, interpreting privacy notices as
contracts may actually make it more difficult to prove bad behavior
of the more powerful party.75
Contracts of adhesion, by definition, involve unequal bargaining
power, often between a sophisticated business and consumers or
some product or service.76 Courts have identified contracts of
adhesion as demonstrating procedural unconscionability due to the
inherent nature of one-sided terms in “take it or leave it” contracts.77
Although contracts of adhesion can form a legitimate legal basis for
a relationship as recognized by law, the individual often does not
have an opportunity to negotiate. However, when contracts of
adhesion are used in repeat-play or ongoing exchanges, such as
using a site like eBay, privacy has a relational underpinning: the
contracts are intended to embody trust between the parties.78 Trust,
although a core part of contracting, unfortunately may be
misplaced.79
72

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
Id.
74
Dov Waisman, Preserving Substantive Unconscionability, 44 SW. L. REV.
297, 299 (2014).
75
See Klass, supra note 63, at 57 (describing that enforcing privacy notices as
part of a contract will likely benefit commercial organizations than consumers).
76
See David A. Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
1395, 1452 (2018).
77
See 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed.).
78
Id. at 1454.
79
See infra, Part III and accompanying notes.
73
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What is especially problematic, though, is that the inducement
to provide personal information is something more than a typical
commercial exchange: individuals provide personal information
that is only created by existing as a human being; information that,
once lost or misused, cannot be returned, replaced, or deleted.80 And
when one of the parties takes some action that harms trust, due to
information asymmetries and power differentials, the impact will be
felt by the consumer, likely not the organization.81
Further, the act of consenting to a privacy notice is something
more than accepting a traditional contractual agreement when it
involves personal information.82 Although consent-as-agreement
simply demonstrates agreement to follow something, usually terms
of use, consent to a privacy notice is actually quite different. Privacy
notices are typically one-sided communication of an organization’s
behaviors with respect to data, which means that consent is only
agreement to an implication: “I consent to you doing those things
you said you would do.”

80
Danielle Keats Citron and Daniel Solove have explained the potential types
of harm resulting from data misuse or breach. See generally Danielle Keats
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1847 (describing the
evolution of harms to financial vulnerabilities associated with the release of
sensitive persona information); Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy
Harms, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782222 [https://
perma.cc/U6DQ-R4CN] (proposing a taxonomy of privacy harms). Central to this
argument, however, is that personal data are somehow exceptional—namely that
they are about a person, the entire reason privacy law exists in the first place and
correspondingly why it is difficult to effectively compensate their misuse or loss.
See Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL. L. REV. 439,
450–51 (2017). The personal nature of these data, then, are what makes them
worth protecting and potentially damaging if misused or breached.
81
See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 1453. Hoffman describes this as “sharing of
benefits and burdens,” which, at least for contracts of adhesion, often result in
fewer benefits and greater burden to the consumer. Id.
82
This is where privacy actions, especially consenting to a privacy policy,
illustrate something between contract and tort. In tort, not abiding by
commitments in the policy might evidence a “wrong,” whereas breaching the
privacy policy as a contract does not evidence a wrong but triggers some remedy.
Consent as a function, then, super-charges the effects of a contract of adhesion.
The harm is potential of a different character than for traditional commercial
contracts.
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Even more, consent is not necessarily consent to just one
activity. Many organizations do not collect, use, and retain data for
only one purpose.83 Although it may appear that personal
information will be collected primarily for a service the consumer
desires, often data are used for other purposes, exchanged with third
parties, and, in many cases, aggregated and sold.84 A privacy notice
or terms of use agreement with privacy terms usually communicate
these secondary uses, but the use of a contract of adhesion renders
consent applicable to all potential uses.85
In bundled privacy policies and terms of use agreements that
include privacy terms, individuals who do read the terms might find
it difficult to separate secondary uses from primary uses (uses
specific to the product or service desired by the consumer).86 For
example, an individual may not wish to permit their data to be shared
with third-party data aggregators or brokers, but this is bundled with
other primary uses required to use the service, such as registering
for an account. A contract of adhesion, although not illegal or
unethical on its face, creates a higher likelihood of unconscionable
or at least unfair practices in relation to personal information for
these reasons.87
In addition to privacy policies that reference primary and
secondary uses, creating a type of coercive contracting for personal
information, many privacy notices also contain some language
giving the organization the right to change the terms at any time.88
83
Uses outside the primary purpose for collection, namely providing goods or
services, are typically called secondary uses, and frequently these uses are
bundled in privacy notices. See Tschider, The Consent Myth, supra note 20, at
1515.
84
See Your Data Is Shared and Sold . . . What’s Being Done About It?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (OCT. 28, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/article/data-shared-sold-whats-done/ [https://perma.cc/UN46-EYNR].
85
See generally Carol M. Hayes & Jay P. Kesan, Privacy, Law, and Cloud
Services, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLOUD COMPUTING 245 (San Murugesan & Irena
Bojanova eds., 2016), https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118821930.ch20 [https://perma.cc/
XDD9-K593] (describing the challenges of managing privacy with the inclusion
of third parties, secondary uses, and data transfer).
86
See Tschider, The Consent Myth, supra note 20, at 1520.
87
Id. at 1520 n.78.
88
See Klass, supra note 63, at 56–57.
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In the United States, contract law does not limit an organization’s
ability to change material terms, or require any re-consenting to new
terms.89 And, if the consumer does not want their data to be
collected, used, and retained pursuant to new terms, the only option
for that consumer is to stop service. This means that the actual terms
hardly matter to the enforceability of the agreement, so long as
consent is gathered at some time. It is clear, then, that actual
acceptance of the terms of the agreement and, following, assent, is
truly not important; consent is. If consent, then, has less power than
assent in contract law, what value does it really have?
Consent is even more ineffectual as a proxy for consumer choice
in contract law than in tort law, in part due to its essential position
in contract formation. First, the relational position of the consumer
versus the organization makes for an inherently one-sided
relationship,90 one in which no promises are actually made, and
where even the terms provided to induce consent can be changed at
the election of one party.91 These contractual issues occur across a
background where unconscionability is already very difficult to
prove in a court of law and where parties have to rely on courts to
determine what is and is not unconscionable.92 Indeed, as Paul
Bennet Marrow suggests, “it’s a bit like religion: unconscionability
89

Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Contracts proposed language includes the
reporters’ observation that additional requirements regarding assent in privacy
notices would result in increased transactions costs without real benefit. Id. at 53–
54.
90
It should be noted here that the duties of a party in contract are specified in
the contract rather than in tort, where duties are based on a similarly situated or
reasonably prudent organization. Part III describes how this divergence between
these two bodies of law has resulted in a call for a unique form of fiduciary
relationship: the information fiduciary. While the Author does not believe an overt
requirement for information fiduciary status is warranted, the recommendation in
Part IV illustrates how enhanced obligations as an alternative to consent can
nevertheless inure to specific kinds of parties collecting, using, and retaining
personal information.
91
See Klass, supra note 63, at 56–57.
92
Paul Bennett Marrow, Contractual Unconscionability: Identifying and
Understanding Its Potential Elements, 72 J. N.Y. BAR ASS’N 18, 20 (2000). Much
more can be said about unconscionability, but the takeaway here is that as a way
to find a privacy notice unenforceable, this is unlikely to render a positive outcome
for plaintiffs.
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exists in the minds of true believers. This seems to leave the
draftsman with the charge of predicting the whims of mysterious
forces.”93 The question, then, is why does consent have any real
value when what an individual consents to might not even represent
any actual commitment? If it can represent some commitment, how
can consent to unfair, one-sided, readily changeable terms actually
represent real choice? While a consumer’s consent might
demonstrate an intention to be bound, the organization’s privacy
notice communication does not.
C. Federal Statutes Including Consent
The United States has, at least for sectoral laws, included
consent, whether explicit or implied, in federal and state law.94 It is
possible that such state legislatures and Congress recognized the
challenges of integrating informational privacy within the
traditional common law system of tort and contract. More likely, it
resulted from a recognition of potential consequentialist risks
inherent in using personal information within computerized
systems, such as disclosure of sensitive data to parties adverse to the
interests of the individual.95
National discussions around consent in federal law began in the
late 1960s, spurred by national initiatives for statistical data
gathering.96 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”) first
established a consent requirement for medical record access.97
93

Id.
See Tschider, The Consent Myth, supra note 20, at 1515 (describing
authorization under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act);
TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 88 n.89.
95
These are the types of risks typically recognized in privacy harm analysis, as
in Danielle Keats Citron and Daniel Solove’s work. See generally Citron &
Solove, supra note 80 (identifying consequentialist risks as harms).
96
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICAL USES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
RECORDS: RECENT RESEARCH AND PRESENT PROSPECTS 472 (1984).
97
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i). The primary reason for requiring individual consent for
medical record disclosure was due to a concern over medical data interpretation
without counsel of a qualified practitioner and retention of the traditional
physician-patient relationship. See The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Are Business
Credit Reports Regulated?, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1233 n.21 (1971). Since 1970,
94
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Congress commissioned further inquiry via the Professional
Standards Review Organizations (“PSROs”) and the Privacy
Protection Study Commission in 1972 and 1977, respectively, which
both explored the concept.98
In 1972, Congress created the PSROs to monitor
appropriateness, quality, and outcomes of services provided to
government health program beneficiaries.99 The propensity for
people to move and the increased use of medical records in legal
proceedings (especially in malpractice suits) buoyed development
and concentrated focus on medical record-keeping.100 Participants in
the subsequent Factual Service Bureau’s medical records hearings
criticized consent and authorization procedures used traditionally by
medical care providers.101 Commission witnesses described how a
patient form effectively results in a patient “signing away all control
over what is disclosed and what may be done with it thereafter,” and
that such disclosures are broadly worded.102
1. Government Studies on Privacy – The 1970s
In 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(“HEW”) drafted an advisory report, Records, Computers, and the
Right of Citizens, which informed much of the Privacy Act of 1974
governing federal privacy guarantees.103 Importantly, HEW first
raised a principle of consent in relation to purposes outside those
communicated to an individual: “[t]he agency should ‘assure that no
use of individually identifiable data is made that is not within the
stated purposes of the system as reasonably understood by the
the FCRA now requires various types of consent for different activities, such as
an affirmative consent requirement to access medical information for insurance
purposes and a written consent requirement for employment background checks.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a.
98
PRIV. PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1977). The PSROs initially focused on consistency for cost control and
quality assessment, recognizing the tradeoffs between service and personal
privacy.
99
See id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 96, at 472.
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individual, unless the informed consent of the individual has been
explicitly obtained.’”104 Explicit consent usually requires some overt
manifestation of consent, such as clicking a button or providing a
signature, and HEW’s focus on “explicit consent” at that time likely
conveyed a seriousness in relying on consent as representative of
individual choice.105
Moreover, HEW first created an advisory committee, the
Advisory Committee on Automated Data Systems (“Advisory
Committee”), to identify information practices that could reduce
individual privacy risk.106 The Advisory Committee proposed the
following “fair information practice principles” (“FIPPs”) with
respect to personal information (broadly defined):
1) No . . . record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret
[Transparency]; 2) a way for an individual to find out what information
about him is in a record and how it is used [Access]; 3) a way for an
individual to prevent information about him obtained for one purpose
from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent
[Choice]; 4) a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information [Correction]; 5) any organizations creating,
maintaining, using, or disseminating records . . . must assure the
reliability of the data for their intended use and must take reasonable
precautions to prevent misuse of the data [Security].107

These FIPPs were adopted by the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) in its evaluation of unfair or deceptive trade practices,
which are now considered guidance informing the FTC’s
interpretation of what constitutes unfair or deceptive trade practices
under Section 5 of the FTC Act.108
104

Id. at 473.
See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 15.
106
Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices, WORLD
PRIV. F. (Dec. 19, 2007), https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-abrief-introduction-to-fair-information-practices/ [https://perma.cc/V77V-VLGD].
107
Id.; Letters from Willis W. Ware and Caspar W. Weinberger (July 1, 1973),
https://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/foreword.htm [https://perma.cc/QP8F2EAJ].
108
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE ii–iii (May 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practiceselectronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf
105
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Anticipating a computerized future on the horizon, Congress
created the Privacy Protection Study Commission in 1977
(“Commission”) to broadly consider privacy in data banks,
automatic data processing programs, and information systems,
including private organizations.109 The Commission specifically
cautioned against reliance on individual authorizations for privacy
in medical record-keeping:
One tends to forget that a patient usually has no way of knowing what is
in a medical record about him, no way of controlling the accuracy or
pertinence of the information it contains . . . As indicated earlier, consent
to the disclosure of medical-record information about oneself is rarely
voluntary . . . [A]n authorization can serve as a means of controlling the
disclosure of information about oneself but never as a means of giving
voluntary consent, and it can only serve as a means of control if the
patient knows what it is he is authorizing to be disclosed.110

The Commission observed that patients should have the ability
to pursue their own privacy objectives outside a basic authorization,
including: the ability to access and correct medical record contents,
improved awareness of consent and medical record uses, and the
ability to “control not only the amount and type of information that
is disclosed to other types of users, but also the conditions under
which such disclosures are made.”111
The Commission eventually recommended seven authorization
requirements, including that such authorization occur prior to
information disclosure, in writing, signed by the individual.112 The
contents of the disclosure include information about the recipients
of the information, the nature of the information disclosed, the
purposes for information use at time of disclosure and in the future,
and an expiration date not to exceed two years.113
Special focus on general privacy began with HEW’s advisory
report in 1973,114 but until 1996, Congress did not commission any
[https://perma.cc/8EMY-MT8A]; The Fed. Trade Comm’n Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C
§ 45 [hereinafter FTC Act].
109
See PRIV. PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 98.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 96, at 472–73.
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additional inquiry for health sector privacy, especially for private
entities.115 By the mid-1980s, Congress focused on communications
privacy, passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”) in 1986 to broadly regulate modern digital
communications over the Internet.116 The ECPA, importantly,
included a consent exception for a broad prohibition on accessing
electronic communications, including a federal standard of
one-person consent that could grant access to providers.117
2. The Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
The most significant sectoral privacy developments for the
United States included the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), which echoed a similar model in the
financial sector, the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (“GLBA”).118 HIPAA
was originally the brainchild of the Workgroup for Electronic Data
Interchange Committee (“WEDI”), which was commissioned to
reduce healthcare administrative costs by the first Bush
Administration in 1991.119 The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) developed the HIPAA Privacy Rule
(“Privacy Rule”) over the course of three years, after substantial
comments and changing perspectives on whether consent was
115

See, e.g., The Government in Sunshine Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 552b; The
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-503, Pub.
L. 101-56 (1988) (amended 1989); The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44
U.S.C. § 3501.
116
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510,
2701. The ECPA provided an option for explicit consent to overcome providers
accessing electronic communications. See id.
117
Id. The consent exemption under the ECPA is so broad you can drive a truck
through it, so to speak. And, for criminal law scholars, the ECPA’s consent
exemption helped to mobilize the oft-publicized third-party doctrine, wherein
(with some limits) law enforcement could lawfully access personal information
shared with a third-party like an electronic communications service provider
pursuant to consent. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REV. 561, 572 (2009).
118
Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data
Protection, 117 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 143, 149–50 (2017).
119
Joseph Conn, HIPAA, 10 Years After, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 7, 2006,
1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20060807/NEWS/608070324/
hipaa-10-years-after; About Us, WEDI (2018), https://www.wedi.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/NEU4-FX73].
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integral to the Privacy Rule.120 Ultimately, HHS did not integrate
consent for all healthcare activities into the Privacy Rule.121
As the name might suggest, HIPAA’s first draft pivoted a broad
administrative goal into a bipartisan insurance reform agenda.122
Senators Nancy Landon Kassebaum and Edward M. Kennedy
originally designed HIPAA to allow portability of insurance
between employers with protection for preexisting conditions,
so-called “job lock.”123 The bi-partisan HIPAA bill passed
unanimously in the Senate in 1996, establishing requirements for the
digitization and standardization of electronic health data
record-keeping.124 However, the crucial Privacy Rule was not passed
until seven years later, with considerable challenges.125
HHS developed the first version of the Privacy Rule at the end
of 2000, with the final version effective in April of 2003.126 HHS had
developed the Privacy Rule because Congress had failed to create a
privacy rule with sufficient support by August of 2000, when HHS
was triggered to develop the rule.127 The Privacy Rule, in its original
form, which had stripped out consent requirements, received 54,000

120

See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RSCH. SERV. RS20934,
THE HIPAA MEDICAL PRIVACY RULE , at CRS-5 (2003).
121

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF

Id. at CRS-6.
Jane Hiebert-White, Who Won What in the Kassebaum/Kennedy Struggle?
HEALTH PROGRESS (Oct. 1996), https://www.chausa.org/docs/defaultsource/health-progress/health-policy---who-won-what-in-thekassebaumkennedy-struggle-pdf.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/8V6L-UEJ9].
123
Id.
124
See STEVENS, supra note 120; HIPAA – the Federal Medical Privacy Rule,
CITIZENS’ COUNCIL FOR HEALTH FREEDOM [hereinafter CITIZENS’ COUNCIL],
http://www.cchfreedom.org/cchf.php/268 [https://perma.cc/Q8SZ-M8CQ] (last
visited Apr. 1, 2018).
125
Id.
126
See The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104–191, August 21, 1996, 110 Stat 1936; CITIZENS’ COUNCIL, supra note
124. The first version of HIPAA required that Congress develop a privacy rule
by August 1999. Failing this, HHS would have to draft a privacy rule.
127
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104–191, August 21, 1996, 110 Stat 1936; see CITIZENS’ COUNCIL, supra note
124.
122
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public comments, with eighty percent of comments referencing
“losing control” over access to record data.128
As a result of the commentary, HHS reversed its position and
reintroduced consent language.129 In 2001, the Bush Administration
reopened the comment period and received an additional 24,000
comments.130 The majority of comments favored consent, and the
Bush Administration retained the consent provision.131 By 2002,
however, the Bush Administration had removed consent from the
Privacy Rule and received an additional 11,000 comments favoring
consent.132 It appears that organizations providing health services
were concerned about operationalizing a consent requirement when
many steps of healthcare provisioning occur in advance of actual
patient treatment.133 In August 2002, the Privacy Rule was passed
without incorporating consent, instead introducing a reasonable
acknowledgement of receipt and explicit written authorization for
secondary data uses.134
HIPAA is unique in that it combines both implied consent for
primary data uses (treatment, payment, and healthcare operations)
and explicit consent to balance market interests in administrative

128

See Conn, supra note 119.
See CITIZENS’ COUNCIL, supra note 124.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See Why Was the Consent Requirement Eliminated from the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, and How Will It Affect Individuals’ Privacy Protections?, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/faq/193/why-was-the-hipaa-privacy-rule-consent-requirementremoved/index.html [https://perma.cc/364R-LJ5R].
134
See Conn, supra note 119. In recent developments, HHS has now moved
towards eliminating the reasonable acknowledgement requirement in its proposed
rule changes along with bolstering other privacy commitments, such as timely
fulfillment of access requests. See Anna D. Kraus, Libbie Canter, Rebecca Yergin
& Tara Carrier, HHS Announces Proposed Changes to HIPAA’s Privacy Rule,
COVINGTON
DIGIT.
HEALTH
BLOG
(Dec.
21,
2020),
https://www.covingtondigitalhealth.com/2020/12/hhs-announces-proposedchanges-to-hipaas-privacy-rule/ [https://perma.cc/98UB-CGWZ].
129
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efficiency with privacy for protected health information (“PHI”).135
However, unlike other laws establishing a ceiling for privacy
obligations with express preemptive power, HIPAA created a floor,
permitting state legislatures to pass more restrictive laws applicable
to PHI.
3. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The GLBA quickly followed HIPAA’s initial passage in 1996,
establishing privacy requirements in 1999.136 The goal of GLBA was
to modernize financial transactions in light of new mergers that
would have enabled unrestricted access to personal information
from a variety of different organizations, such as insurers, banks,
stockbrokers, and other financial institutions.137 GLBA sought to
include more of these merged organizations by applying GLBA
broadly to “financial institutions.”138
GLBA is interesting because it begins with a statutorily created
obligation: “each financial institution has an affirmative and
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to
protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’
nonpublic personal information.”139 This statutorily created duty
removed any question regarding the nature of duties pursuant to
financial contracts between customers and their financial
institutions.140

135
There is no consent requirement under HIPAA for treatment, payment, and
healthcare operations, only required acknowledgement. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(e)
(2013). Consent is required for authorizing secondary data uses. 45 C.F.R. §
164.508(a)(2)–(a)(4), (b)(5) (2013).
136
See The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 [hereinafter
GLBA]. After GLBA was passed, the law was copied and applied to investment
brokerages by the Securities Exchange Commission under Regulation S-P (Reg
S-P). See 7 C.F.R. § 248.1 (2004).
137
The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, EPIC (2021), http://epic.org/privacy/glba/
default.html [https://perma.cc/E6GA-LPNG].
138
15 U.S.C. § 6801; 12 U.S.C. § 1813.
139
15 U.S.C. § 6801(a).
140
This imprecision regarding relational duties in organization to consumer
contracts is specifically the challenge associated with determining commitments
in a privacy notice within common law contract disputes. See supra Part II(D)(2).
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Despite creating a duty, consent was not required under
GLBA.141 Although Senator Richard H. Bryan of Nevada proposed
an amendment “to give customers notice and choice about how their
financial institutions share or sell personally identifiable sensitive
financial information,” the amendment was ultimately withdrawn.142
Rather, a financial institution’s customer could “opt-out” of certain
data transfers to third parties after being provided notice.143 Opt-outs,
here, worked by creating consent by implication: if a customer did
not opt-out, it was presumed the customer consented.144 GLBA did
restrict additional downstream data uses beyond the initial
third-party disclosure subject to the opt-out, which limited, at least
in some respects, additional data use beyond what was originally
disclosed.145 Furthermore, prohibitions on disclosure were subject to
a broad exemption, wherein “consent at the direction of the
consumer” would remove any general prohibitions.146
HIPAA and GLBA represent some of the largest and most
comprehensive privacy legislation, albeit sectoral, established in the
United States.147 Both illustrate various approaches to consent.148
141
15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (stating that even though consent is required for sharing
with an unaffiliated third party, consent is implied for the original privacy notice
displayed).
142
S.
900,
S.
Amdt.
316,
106th
Cong.
(1999–2000),
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/106th-congress/senateamendment/316?r=3&s=a [https://perma.cc/WM2T-GB9G].
143
15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1).
144
This is consent by implication. See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 15.
145
15 U.S.C. § 6802(c).
146
H.R. REP. NO. 106-434 (1999-2000); 15 U.S.C. § 6801(e)(2).
147
Both laws include not only privacy obligations but also information security
requirements in the form of, respectively, the Security Rule and Safeguards. See
DEREK E. BAMBAUER, JUSTIN (GUS) HURWITZ, DAVID THAW & CHARLOTTE A.
TSCHIDER, CYBERSECURITY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PROBLEM 414 (2021);
TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 277–78.
148
As previously described, HIPAA requires authorization and GLBA may
require explicit consent in the transfer of data to third parties outside the scope of
primary service-based activities. However, neither require explicit consent for an
individual to receive primary services. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., supra note 133; Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COL. L. REV. 583, 600–04 (2014) (describing
the expansion of jurisdiction and FTC enforcement creating a de facto role of the
FTC as primary privacy authority).
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Despite these various approaches in both laws for HIPAA
authorization and GLBA consumer-directed consent, explicit
consent is the preferred method for overcoming restrictions to
personal information collection and use, especially for downstream
parties.149
4. The FTC Act Section 5
Although several laws, such as the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (“COPPA”) and the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (“TCPA”), illustrate the interesting and sometimes divergent
U.S. procedural models for consent, the most powerful influencer of
privacy behaviors is arguably the FTC.150 In its prosecution of unfair
and deceptive trade practices under Section 5, the FTC has occupied
a role as primary privacy regulator in the United States, despite few
judicial decisions to show for it.151 The FTC is also responsible for
sole rulemaking and enforcement under COPPA, partial rulemaking
and enforcement of GLBA, and promulgation of rules applicable to
the similar activities regulated under TCPA.152

149

See BAMBAUER ET AL., supra note 147; see TSCHIDER, supra note 26.
See The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15
U.S.C. § 6501(9) (requiring consent from parents prior to processing personal
information over the Internet for children under age 13); 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(1)
(2013) (requiring parental reconsent when proposed collection and use changes);
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. § 227.
(permitting opt-out consent revocation rather than upfront consent to receive
marketing calls and texts).
151
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 148, at 600–04 (describing the expansion of
jurisdiction and FTC enforcement creating a de facto role of the FTC as primary
privacy authority).
152
Id. at 602. Despite the authors’ description of the FTC’s enforcement arm
regarding GLBA as “past,” the FTC still has enforcement authority under the
Dodd-Frank Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, Title X, § 1024(c)(3)(A). Further,
FTC obligations under GLBA to create regulations for safeguarding personal
information still apply under Subtitle A. Id. The FTC co-manages the “Do Not
Call Registry,” which was created by administrative rule. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY (June 2019), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
articles/0108-national-do-not-call-registry
[https://perma.cc/Z9K8-X2E3].
Similarly, the FTC enforces the Telemarketing Sales Rule. 16 C.F.R. § 310
(2010).
150
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Congress passed the FTC Act in 1914 as part of the Clayton
Act.153 In the original version of the FTC Act, Section 5 stated
“[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared
unlawful.”154 As originally enacted, legislative history demonstrates
that Congress intended to give the FTC broad authority to enforce
against a wide variety of conduct, not limited by specifically
enumerated practices or categories of practices.155 In FTC v. R.F.
Keppel & Bro., Inc.,156 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 5 as
applicable to consumers rather than only applicable to
anti-competitive activities.157 The Wheeler-Lea Amendments of
1938 made the FTC’s consumer focus explicit.158 The current text
gives the FTC broad rulemaking and enforcement authority over
unfair or deceptive trade practices (“UDAP”) authority.159
At the federal level, generalized “privacy law” is often enforced
by the FTC under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which enables the FTC
to enforce against UDAP.160 In addition to prosecuting for inaccurate
product labels, the FTC has adapted Section 5 to information
privacy and security, arguably creating a body of law through
enforcement actions and settlements that is somewhat consistent,
producing some degree of predictability.161 The FTC’s FIPPs,
although non-binding in their authoritative function, in addition to
153

See Peter C. Carstensen & Nina H. Questal, Use of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 841, 850 (1978).
154
Id. at 850–51.
155
Id. at 851. Scholars have criticized the extremely broad nature of FTC
enforcement, especially as it applies to unfair commercial practices. See Teresa
M. Schwartz, Regulating Unfair Practices under the FTC Act: The Need for a
Legal Standard of Unfairness, 11 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2 (describing the FTC as an
“aggressive and imaginative rule-maker, particularly in exploring and expanding
the definition of ‘unfair acts or practices.’”).
156
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Brother, Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
157
See Carstensen & Questal, supra note 153, at 852.
158
CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 3–4 (2016).
159
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
160
See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 148, at 600–04 (describing, in
detail, the role of the FTC under Section 5 as the default privacy regulator in the
United States).
161
See id. at 619.
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the FTC’s consent orders and settlements, give some sense of how
the FTC interprets UDAP in relation to privacy.162 Notably, the
FIPPs denote notice and “choice” as appropriate mechanisms,
absent any discussion of contextual or other relational imperfections
that could render consent ineffective.163
The FTC’s focus on investigation and enforcement under UDAP
rather than legislative development has led scholars such as Daniel
J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog to call the FTC’s enforcement
activity the “New Common Law of Privacy.”164 Not only has the
FTC established an informal precedential function in its collective
of consent decrees, but it has also developed a “soft law” of sorts
with guides, guidelines, reference documents, and reports. These not
only govern future FTC enforcement activities but also put the
community of privacy professionals and organizations on notice via
publicly posting these materials.165
The FTC, through regulatory oversight of federal laws,
collaborative oversight over others, and a broad consumer
protection directive under the FTC Act, has certainly embraced its
default position as the primary privacy regulator, enforcing
UDAP.166 Since 1995, the FTC has heavily focused on protecting
162

See FTC Act § 45.
It should be noted that although the word “choice” is used, consent is
contextually how the choice requirement is fulfilled. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note
158, at 5–6. The FTC has a variety of mechanisms for enforcing against unfair or
deceptive trade practices including injunctive relief, equitable relief, or fine
structures, typically finalized via a consent decree, or settlement.
164
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 148, at 619.
165
See id. at 625–27.
166
The FTC has specific, not general enforcement authority within the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”). See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6502(a), 6503, 6505. The FTC also enjoys co-extensive regulatory
enforcement with the Federal Communications Commission over The Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”). See 15 U.S.C. § 6102(c)(2), and the
FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”). The FTC, along with the Department
of Commerce, are also positioned to receive EU complaints on behalf of the
United States, though it is unknown what future the FTC has with respect to crossgeographic data transfer arrangements after the recent Schrems I & Schrems II
cases. See GUIDE TO THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, EUR. COMM’N 12 (2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2016-08-01-ps-citizens-guide_en.pd_.pdf
163
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sensitive consumer information, and beginning in 2002, the FTC
protected data security practices as an extension of privacy.167 In
2001, the FTC shifted away from seeking new privacy legislation to
enforcing existing consumer protection statutes as its primary
objective.168
The sectoral, statutory, and UDAP approaches to privacy law in
the United States illustrate that regardless of whether consent is
explicit or implied, consent is the primary mechanism for legally
permitting collection and use of personal information, a functional
proxy for choice. Indeed, although many privacy laws include other
management requirements, such as providing for access requests to
personal information and the ability to correct personal information,
notice and consent continue to be a lodestar in U.S. privacy law.
III. THE EU’S DATA PROTECTION HISTORY
The EU’s data protection laws originated as an extension of civil
rights commitments after World War II.169 From early
developments, consent was an important (but not exclusive) part of
EU law.170 Importantly, consent was not the only lawful basis for
processing data under the Data Protection Directive of 1995, even
before the GDPR came into effect in 2018.171 Consent in the EU, as
one of multiple lawful bases for processing, was not necessarily
[https://perma.cc/6QZ5-AV4Q]; Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650
(E.C.J.); Data Protection Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 2018 E.C.R. 559
(E.C.J.).
167
GINA STEVENS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43723, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION’S REGULATION OF DATA SECURITY UNDER ITS UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES (UDAP) AUTHORITY 1–3 (2014).
168
Id. at 3. This movement likely inspired Daniel Solove and Woodrow
Hartzog’s investigation of FTC enforcement strategies. See also Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 148, at 588 (describing the FTC as “reigning over more
territory than any other agency that deals with privacy”). Cf. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz,
Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 980 (2016)
(arguing that although the FTC has developed “common law” through potentially
coherent rules does not necessarily mean this less or “un” common law effectively
reflects effective judicial practices, particularly when FTC activities remove other
decision-making bodies from the process).
169
See infra Part III(A) and accompanying notes.
170
See infra Part III(B) and accompanying notes.
171
See infra Part III(B) and accompanying notes.
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used as a proxy for choice.172 Rather, consent facilitates a data
subject’s personal risk acceptance for the benefit of an organization
(public or private).173 Today, consent is one of multiple means for
brokering decisions related to personal information, including
balancing tests like legitimate interest balancing.174
A. Data Protection Origins in Civil Rights
In Europe, organized commitments to common human rights
resulted from atrocities in World War II, when governments used
personal information about citizens to arrest and kill them simply
based on their status, including ethnic origins, religious affiliations,
and disability status. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted on December 10, 1948, and actively promoted by the
United States through Eleanor Roosevelt’s position on the drafting
committee,175 memorialized a common commitment to “the inherent
dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the human race in
the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”176 The
UN Declaration formed the basis for developing informational
privacy law:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family home or correspondence, nor to attack upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right of the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks. [ . . . ] Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.177

Although the United States strongly influenced the development
of this crucially important declaration, soon after, the United States
began to distance itself from similar international human rights

172

See infra Part III(D)–(E) and accompanying notes.
See infra Part III(D) and accompanying notes.
174
See infra Part III(D) and accompanying notes.
175
Marie Wilken, U.S. Aversion to International Human Rights Treaties, GLOB.
JUST. CTR. BLOG (June 22, 2017), https://www.globaljusticecenter.net/blog/773u-s-aversion-to-international-human-rights-treaties [https://perma.cc/QVJ2-BWNP].
176
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
177
Id. at art. 12, art. 19 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
173
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commitments.178 The Council of Europe, however, continued to
solidify its commitment to privacy in successive conventions and
laws. The Council of Europe and European signatories confirmed
many of the commitments of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and prohibited government interference in these rights.179
These rights, however, even for European signatories, were not
absolute, noting:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society . . . for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence . . . .180

Following technological developments and an increased
concern for informational privacy, the Council of Europe published
Recommendation 509 on human rights, and in 1973 and 1974
focused on the role of data banks with respect to privacy
commitments.181
B. European Country Developments
After the Council of Europe provided broad recommendations,
individual countries began to develop individualized approaches to
privacy by passing both bars on the government use of personal
information and commitments to privacy in their Constitutions.182 A
state in Germany was the first to pass such a commitment to
informational privacy as statute in 1970, followed by a national
statute in 1977, the Gesetz zum Schutz vor Mißbrauch
178

Notably, the United States was the ninety-eighth signatory on the
Convention on the Preservation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, finally
signing in 1980 under the leadership of President Carter, despite the original
Convention being drafted in 1948. See Wilken, supra note 175; Jimmy Carter,
Genocide Convention Message to the Senate Recommending Ratification (May
23, 1977).
179
See Sian Rudgard, Origins and Development of European Data Protection
Law, in EUR. DATA PROT. L. & PRAC. 1, 5–6 (Eduardo Ustaran et al. eds., 2nd ed.
2018).
180
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 10(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
181
See Rudgard, supra note 179, at 7.
182
Id.
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personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung, or the
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz.183 The first European country to actually
have a national data privacy authority was Sweden, as early as
1976.184
France similarly passed a national statute in 1978, the Act No.
78-17 of January 6, 1978, on Data Processing, Data Files, and
Individual Liberties, simultaneously creating the first information
privacy regulator, the Commission Nationale de L’informatique et
des Libertés.185 These two countries’ early approaches likely
influenced the development of later European commitments to
information privacy, including those of other member states and the
highly influential Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) Guidelines.186
Notably, the original Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1977 in
Germany explicitly references consent as the primary means of
permitting access to personal information, generally by physical
signature.187 However, it also describes transfer of personal
information being permitted when it is necessary for “lawful
performance of the tasks under the responsibility of the transmitting
body” or if the recipient can demonstrate a “legitimate interest” in
the data being transmitted, when the rights of the data subject are
not diminished.188
Similarly, in France, Act No. 78-17 required consent when
processing data that are sensitive in nature, such as racial origins,
183

See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 8.
See ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY REGULATING
PERSONAL DATA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 87 (2008).
185
Id.
186
See infra Part III(C) and accompanying notes; Hon. Michael Kirby, The
History, Achievement and Future of the 1980 OECD Guidelines on Privacy, 1
INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 6, 9–10 (2011) (describing the involvement of
representatives from France and Germany).
187
Gesetz zum Schutz vor Mißbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der
Datenverarbeitung [Bundesdatenschutzgesetz – BDSG] [Federal Data Protection
Act], Jan. 27, 1977, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI] at 7 201, § 3, as amended Nov.
2019, BGBI 1626 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bdsg_2018/BDSG.pdf
(describing the writing requirement as only not being required due to special
circumstances).
188
Id. at § 11.
184
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political, philosophical, or religious opinions, and union
membership.189 Although the French government did not introduce
the concept of legitimate interest or other lawful processing, it did
establish a regulatory model where organizations are responsible for
registering themselves and the details of their processing activities
with the government agency.190 This registration activity presumably
would have provided some ability to examine what organizations
are doing, and whether what was disclosed matches what they are
actually doing with respect to consumers.
C. The OECD Guidelines
As early as 1976, the European Commission was asked by the
European Parliament to begin directing a harmonized data
protection approach as countries like Germany and France began
passing their own laws, while others passed Constitutional
amendments.191 Around the same time, the OECD worked in tandem
with the European Commission to develop the OECD Guidelines
while the Council of Europe held the Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data.192 The OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (“OECD Guidelines”) was
completed in 1979, which were initiated by the Data Bank Panel as
early as 1969.193 The OECD Guidelines, created in 1980, have
greatly influenced international laws on information privacy,
including outside the EU, likely in part due to careful co-operation
with the Council of Europe.194
The OECD Guidelines are tremendously helpful not only in
what they contain, a blueprint for privacy principles, but for what
189

Loi 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux
libertés [Data Protection Act], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227 (Fr.).
190
Id. at § 19.
191
See Rudgard, supra note 179, at 7.
192
Id.
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See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 9–10; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS
OF PERSONAL DATA (1980), reprinted in OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION
OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 11 (2003).
194
See Kirby, supra note 186, at 10.
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they do not include, which would be mirrored in country-specific
privacy models.195 Absent from the Guidelines are any reference to
direct legal conditions for processing, instead focusing on steps an
organization must take, such as limiting data use and disclosure for
purposes specified upon its collection, and only permitting uses
outside these purposes “with the consent of the data subject; or by
the authority of law.”196 Further, the OECD Guidelines explained
that “[t]here should be limits to the collection of personal data and
any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and,
where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data
subject.”197
Notably, in the OECD Guidelines principles, the OECD
recognized “the economic value of information and the importance
of protecting ‘data trade’ by accepting rules of fair competition.”198
Despite a focus on civil rights, the OECD Guidelines seemed to
contemplate the dual needs for individual choice and commercial
development.
In the early 1980s, nearly two-thirds of European countries had
some national privacy rules, but despite this, European community
policymakers resisted formal consistency, instead calling for
national legislation.199 Finally, in 1989, consistency in a privacy
approach became more desirable, and the national data protection
authorities met in Berlin to collectively begin a coordinated
approach.200 The European Commission presented its privacy
directive in 1992, and, in 1995, the EU Data Protection Directive
was passed.201
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See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 8.
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Id. at 44.
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NEWMAN, supra note 184, at 84.
200
Id. at 88.
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Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
(“Data Protection Directive”), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=NL [https://perma.cc/WJ6T-53NY].
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D. The Data Protection Directive of 1995
The Data Protection Directive (“the Directive”) sought to adopt
the OECD Guidelines and create uniformity between the EU
member states.202 The Directive permitted each country to pass a
variation of the directive within each country’s statutory system.203
Although the Directive began as a legally enforceable framework,
countries were not bound to pass the Directive as written.204 The
Directive ultimately was duplicated by several countries outside of
the EU.205
The now-superseded Directive referenced consent in three
articles. First, Article 7(a) of the Directive referenced consent as one
of multiple lawful bases for processing.206 As one of multiple lawful
mechanisms for data processing, consent could demonstrate that
organizations lawfully could process data, but it was one of many
options, not the sole mechanism.207 Next, under Article 8(2)(a),
when sensitive personal information was collected, or specifically
enumerated “special categories” of data, explicit consent was
required.208 Finally, according to Article 26(1)(a), data could be
transferred to countries without an adequate level of protection
according to EU standards if consent was unambiguous.209
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See id.
Difference between a Regulation, Directive and Decision, U.S. DEPT. OF
AGRIC. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.usda-eu.org/eu-basics-questions/differencebetween-a-regulation-directive-and-decision/ [https://perma.cc/7RR8-H3WG].
204
Id.
205
See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 10.
206
See Data Protection Directive, supra note 201, at art. 7.
207
Id.
208
Id. at art. 8(2)(a).
209
Id. at art. 26(1)(a). One foundational element of the EU system was a broad
prohibition on data transfer outside the EU unless one of three conditions was
satisfied: 1) transfer to a third country determined to be “adequate” under formal
Article 29 Working Party determination, 2) use of standard contractual clauses to
contractually bind private entities to employ data protection mechanisms that
were identical to the EU Data Protection requirements, and 3) formal review and
approval of binding corporate rules (“BCRs”), which held organizations
accountable to EU standards through their business practices. Id. The
unambiguous consent requirement actually become disfavored for lawful data
transfer such as the standard contractual clauses and adequacy determinations. Id.
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The Data Protection Directive is named as such because the
Directive commits to not only informational privacy protections but
also reasonable security protection for data.210 The combined model
sought to place the data subject at the center of decision-making with
respect to their information, by giving that individual a variety of
tools to self-manage their privacy while also providing regulatory
oversight for activities that are less visible to individuals, commonly
referred to as data subject rights.211
Under the Directive, the various mechanisms listed, including
consent, explicit consent, and unambiguous consent were used for a
single purpose: to overcome a barrier to processing by prompting
individuals to accept risk via their consent.212 Indeed, although
multiple lawful bases for processing were specified, Recital 33
seemed to direct member countries towards consent, with nationally
adopted deviations (derogations) requiring specific notation based
on need:
Whereas data which are capable by their nature of infringing
fundamental freedoms or privacy should not be processed unless the data
subject gives his explicit consent; whereas, however, derogations from
this prohibition must be explicitly provided for in respect of specific
needs, in particular where the processing of these data is carried out for
certain health-related purposes by persons subject to a legal obligation
of professional secrecy or in the course of legitimate activities by certain
associations or foundation the purpose of which is to permit the exercise
of fundamental freedoms.213

The Directive appears to permit information collection and use
to occur when otherwise the risk might be high by involving the
individual in the decision. For example, the privacy notice was an
important requirement under the Directive and, if organizations
relied on consent as the lawful basis for processing, consent was
relative to what information was provided in the notice.214 When
210

See id. at art. 1–17.
Id. § V.
212
See id. §§ II–III. Logically, this follows due to the positioning of consent—
specifically used both as an option for lawful processing but also in situations rife
with potential for abuse, such as in relation to sensitive data or when transferring
to countries not deemed adequate in their privacy laws.
213
See id. at recital 33.
214
See id.
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related to sensitive data, the Directive appears to presume that
sensitive, protected classes of data are especially likely to involve
risk to an individual, which is why the Directive requires explicit
consent, or consent manifested in a tangible way.215 Finally, for data
transfer, consent operates to overcome inherently risky data
transfers to countries that offer no legal data protection
guarantees.216
From this perspective, consent, at least as established by the
Directive in 1995, can be understood as facilitating individual risk
acceptance for purposes of forming a relationship with an
organization. This key difference under EU law—consent as risk
acceptance—may not have been described in this manner under the
Directive.
The overall multi-faceted nature of the Directive, wherein
personal rights guarantees are enumerated separately, illustrates
why consent alone does not promote individual autonomy or
animate individual choice with respect to personal information.
Rather, minimizing data collection, use, and disclosure, registering
data processing activities, and fulfilling individual rights requests
actually functioned to reinforce individual privacy rights, supporting
“self-help” and enabling regulatory oversight.217 The Directive was
tremendously sophisticated not because it included a consent
requirement and applied it broadly within a model of individual civil
rights, but because the multi-faceted data protection framework it
enshrined effectively brokered private and public relational models.
Notably, lawful bases under the Directive included but were not
limited to consent. Additional lawful bases included processing in
furtherance of a contract, out of legal necessity, such as due to an
emergency, where an important public interest requires it, and when
the recipients have a “legitimate” interest in the data.218 Recitals 30,
45, 50, and 58, as well as Articles 6(1)(f), 15(2)(a)–(b), 18(3), 21(3),
and 26(1)(f) all reference legitimate interests, although primarily the
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interest of the data subject is referenced.219 Most interesting are the
justifications for processing listed in the Recitals, specifying
alternatives for further processing after data are collected.220 Data
processing may be permitted for historical, statistical, scientific
purposes: with “consent of the data subject;” if “necessary for the
conclusion or performance of a contract binding on the data
subject;” when carried out to protect the life of the individual; for
tasks in the public interest or official authority; and in the legitimate
interests of a natural or legal person.221
In 2014, the Article 29 Working Party, or the primary EU data
protection authority until the passage of the GDPR, issued guidance
related to legitimate interest as a lawful basis for data processing.222
In it, the Working Party drafted an official opinion for determining
legitimate interest from the perspective of controllers (organizations
determining the purpose and use of collected data) under the
Directive.223
The Article 29 Working Party made some important
observations regarding legitimate interest as part of the Directive’s
Regime and in preparation for the new GDPR in draft form at the
time.224 First, the Working Party references Convention 108, which
was opened for signature in 1981 and was developed in tandem with
the OECD Guidelines, to promote an important distinction:
processing does not always interfere with privacy.225 Rather,
processing must fulfill certain conditions to ensure rights and
freedoms are protected. This distinction is an important one:
processing personal information is simply part of participating in
society and negotiating between private and public spheres; what
matters is that organizations do not abuse the privilege.
219

Id. recitals 30, 45, 50, 58; arts. 6(1)(f), 15(2)(a)–(b), 18(3), 21(3), 26(1)(f).
Id. recitals 27–32.
221
Id. recitals 27–32.
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Opinion of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data No. 06/2014 of 9 April 2015, 844/14/EN WP 217, at
3, https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/
files/2014/wp217_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NMH-5T4K].
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The Article 29 Working Party describes the legitimate interests
of the controller (usually the organization collecting personal
information) as the last lawful basis for data processing.226 This
option calls for a balancing test where the legitimate interests of the
controller must be balanced against the “interests or fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject.”227 What is perhaps most
striking, however, is the Article 29 Working Party’s perception of
consent and other lawful bases under the Directive:
The first five grounds of Article 7 rely on the data subject’s consent,
contractual arrangement, legal obligation or other specifically identified
rationale as ground for legitimacy. When processing is based on one of
these five grounds, it is considered as a priori legitimate and therefore
only subject to compliance with other applicable provisions of the law.
There is in other words a presumption that the balance between the
different rights and interests at stake — including those of the controller
and the data subject — is satisfied — assuming, of course, that all other
provisions of data protection law are complied with.228

The Working Party goes on to explain how the legitimate
interest test requires a specific inquiry, including a balancing test.229
What is perhaps the most remarkable of these comments is the
automatic assumption that, when consent is used, it is considered a
priori legitimate.230 The issues with consent, described in Part IV
demonstrate why a more specific test may actually be more
legitimate, either in addition to explicit consent or in lieu of consent
in limited scenarios.
The Article 29 Working Party also explains how a legitimate
interest test could work in practice.231 First, the interest could “be
compelling and beneficial to society at large,” whereas other
interests could be less compelling, such as a private company
learning about its customers for targeted advertisement.232 Although
organizations have to engage in a balancing test, at a minimum,
interests must meet the following requirements:
226

Id. at 9.
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In order to be relevant under Article 7(f), a ‘legitimate interest’ must
therefore: - be lawful (i.e. in accordance with applicable EU and national
law); - be sufficiently clearly articulated to allow the balancing test to be
carried out against the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject
(i.e. sufficiently specific); - represent a real and present interest (i.e. not
be speculative).233

One important observation of the Working Party is that the
concept of legitimate interest is highly contextual. An interest may
be legitimate if a controller can pursue the interest in a way that
complies with the law.234 Considering this concept more broadly, the
Working Party also seems to suggest that minimal impact to the
rights and freedoms of data subjects might also result in the
likelihood of interest legitimation.235 Although the Working Party
does not ultimately create a formulaic test, its interpretation of
legitimate interest certainly offers perspective as to its creation as an
alternative to other specifically enumerated lawful bases for
processing, such as consent.
E. The General Data Protection Regulation
In 2018, the GDPR became effective for organizations that did
business with EU residents, including extra-territorial
organizations.236 This expansive, long-arm application introduced
EU law to U.S. companies, either through direct regulation as data
controllers or indirect regulation as third-party processors for these
controllers, such as technology third parties.237 The broad
application of the GDPR influenced how many organizations
managed privacy, the most persuasive involving the fine structure:
for U.S. companies not complying with the GDPR, the Data
Protection Authorities have the ability to fine an individual company
up to four percent of its total global revenue.238
The GDPR did not radically change the lawful basis model
introduced under the Directive. Under Article 6(1)(f), the GDPR
similarly included legitimate interest analysis as an alternative to
233
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other lawful basis, and notably, no guidance by the European Data
Protection Board (which superseded the Article 29 Working Party)
has been issued.239 Specific countries have developed models for
analyzing legitimate interest within the confines of the GDPR’s text.
Although privacy scholars have advocated for privacy models
that embody a more comprehensive regulatory approach such as the
GDPR (and, previously, the Directive), very few have considered
how the concept of legitimate interest may be a necessary ingredient
for a fairer, less consent-reliant privacy framework in the United
States.240 The EU’s privacy developments illustrate not only an
omnibus, or broadly applicable (sector-agnostic), framework for
privacy, but also demonstrate an evolution from a focus on consent
to a multi-dimensional privacy model, which acknowledges the
rights and freedoms of data subjects from multiple perspectives.
While consent may still be used heavily under the GDPR and within
country laws, the viability of legitimate interest perhaps offers an
approach the United States can use to better balance individual and
commercial interests.
IV. LEARNING FROM THE EU MODEL
The EU model, in particular the GDPR, has been heralded as the
most privacy-protecting law in the world.241 The United States,
however, has struggled to negotiate the prominence of commercial
behavior and privacy interests, instead focusing sectorally on
protecting the most sensitive of transactions.242 The United States
can balance interests structurally by focusing on the relative
239

Id. at 36.
See generally Tschider, Regulating, supra note 18 (describing the absence
of legitimate interest discussions while relying primarily on consent as the vehicle
for legitimacy of collection and use).
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See Paul Lechner, GDPR: Three Ways the World Has Changed in the
Privacy Law’s First Two Years, CPO MAG. (July 7, 2020), https://
www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/gdpr-three-ways-the-world-haschanged-in-the-privacy-laws-first-two-years/ [https://perma.cc/7E9S-8ACS].
242
Daniel J. Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to
Privacy Law, PRIV. + SEC. BLOG (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/
problems-sectoral-approach-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/D6WY-PRNT]
(describing, as early as 2015, why the sectoral approach creates new problems
due to gaps in protection under this approach).
240

664

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 617

interests of both consumer and organization, while simultaneously
promoting transparency and without replicating an EU model that
may not be readily accepted into American conceptions of privacy.
Legitimate interest balancing, assessment, and sharing, offers an
opportunity to place more of the onus on organizations while
simultaneously relieving privacy fatigue and enabling more
effective individual rights of self-protection.
A. Relational Constructs and Negotiation Between Private and
Public Spheres
Philosophy provides some insight into how individuals negotiate
their relationships with others to make decisions and why relational
models, such as legitimate interest balancing, are more useful in
understanding the concept of choice. Relationship dynamics help to
interpret and evaluate legal approaches to privacy. Jürgen
Habermas, a German philosopher in the critical theory and
pragmatic traditions, wrote extensively on the relationship of
individuals with outside parties, including the government and other
individuals, in his evaluation of the “public sphere.”243 Habermas
defines the public sphere, or the Öffentlichkeit, as a variety of
different public spheres, including the politische Öffentlichkeit
(political public sphere), literarische Öffentlichkeit (literary public
sphere, or commentary), and representative Öffentlichkeit (or the
display of inherent power or dignity before an audience).244 These
definitions provide a more granular understanding of the
Aristotelian oikos and polis.245
Habermas views the connected relationship between individuals
and spheres as a change from a privately oriented lifestyle to one
where “commodity exchange burst out of the confines of the
household economy,” introducing public activity into the private
sphere.246 Following this portrayal, privacy has similarly connected
public activities, defined as any activities outside the private realm,
to the private sphere, and vice-versa, a negotiation between spheres
243
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through commercial activity, usually negotiated via contractual
activity.247 Privacy, then, can be understood as relationship or
overlap in private and public spheres, with these spheres negotiated
between the individual and other participants.248
Habermas posited that the quality of an individual’s interactions
in the public sphere could increase or decrease self-determination,
or the ability of an individual to make choices that do not involve
damage to others.249 These interactions, from a privacy perspective,
presume personal information transfer as part of negotiating
between private and public spheres.250
Unlike clear demarcations of “public” and “private” under the
law, Habermas focused on relationships connecting the private
individual with activity outside the purely personal and private
realm. Negotiations between spheres necessarily included both
action and communicative mechanisms oriented towards successful
outcomes or reaching an understanding, with reaching an
understanding being the more beneficial goal.251 Mechanisms for
reaching an understanding may also be considered a process of
agreement, or Einigung.252 Agreement cannot be achieved by
“outside influence, it has to be accepted or presupposed as valid by
247

See supra, Part II(C) and accompanying notes.
While philosophically negotiation can be understood as the influence of
participants on each other, and rhetoric describes it as communicative activity, the
law has defined it through contextual relationships: contract, tort, and statutory
duties and obligations. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
249
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Self-Determination, 16 EIDOS 100 (2012), http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/eidos/
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from state intervention. However, the concept of making decisions free from other
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participants.”253 Accordingly, action and communication together
create understanding when non-coercive, and between individuals,
action and communication evidence a continuing relationship rather
than a transactional exchange.254
With understanding, an individual can exert autonomy, but
coercive practices undermine consensus-forming communicative
rationality, in that when contextual circumstances do not
collectively promote individual choice overall, public and individual
benefits cannot be realized.255 Indeed, “coercion and deception
infringe upon the voluntary character of an agent’s actions.”256 So
how must consent function to adequately operate as choice? First,
consent must be non-coercive in how it is accomplished. Next,
information provided must be comprehensive and informational
enough to enable voluntary decision-making. Finally, there must be
continuous opportunities to negotiate within this relational model so
long as the relationship exists. As described in Part II, the current

253

Id. at 287.
Typically, in legal conceptions of agreement and, frequently, privacy
mechanisms, the law often governs transactional relationships rather than
continuous ones. For example, a privacy policy evidences a transactional
exchange, albeit one which includes obligations that continuously must be
honored. In contrast, fiduciary relationships and other trust relationships often
include continuous expectations in addition to transactional exchanges. Although
not explored at length here, continuing relationships rely on trust, which has
recently been a subject of much consideration and scholarship. See, e.g., Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap, 126 YALE L. J. 1180, 1188–
91 (2017) (positioning obfuscation as a lack of trust); Ari Waldman, Privacy,
Sharing, and Trust, 67 CASE W.L. REV. 193, 206–07 (2016) [hereinafter
Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust]; Rafi M. Goldberg, Giulia McHenry, Luis
Zambrano Ramos & Celeste Chen, Trust in Internet Privacy and Security and
Online Activity 3 (Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. Working Paper, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757369 [https://perma.cc/
5WGA-RMPC] (finding reduced trust results in less participation).
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Kirsten Wahlstrom & N. Ben Fairweather, Privacy, the Theory of
Communicative Action and Technology, 2013 ETHICOMP CONF. PROCEEDINGS:
THE POSSIBILITIES OF ETHICAL ICT 502, 504 (2013).
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privacy notice and consent model used does not (and perhaps
cannot) effectively meet these requirements.257
The shift from models of individual rights to relational models
involving trust in U.S. privacy legal theory has certainly reinforced
the need for consumers to continuously be able to make decisions
representing their interests. As Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog
have described, considering relational models of trust enables a shift
from procedural mechanisms to ongoing commercial
relationships.258 Most challenging, though, is how privacy models,
even relational ones, can appropriately reformulate ongoing
commercial relationships when there are known and substantial
issues with the notice and consent model used in relationship
formation from the outset. In short: layering trust on a broken model
cannot “cure” existing consent problems or result in a trustworthy
relational model. Considering a new model to replace or supplement
notice and consent could build a foundation worthy of trust-based
and fiduciary relationships.259
B. The Consent Myth and Pathologies of Consent
A focus on consent as choice mistakes the idea that choice is a
transaction, a one-time exchange, rather than an ongoing relational
model. Here, choice represents a singular moment, similar to
agreement in contract formation, when in reality, choice could be
fulfilled by a variety of other means, distributed in time and
performed by any number of parties involved in the relationship,
from primary to third parties and organizations brokering these
relationships.260 Preference management, consent revocation and
257

See supra, Part II and accompanying notes.
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 25, at 452 (identifying the role of trust in
information processing and associated duties of loyalty).
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See Balkin, supra note 43, at 13–14 (positioning a fiduciary model for
privacy, due to the inherent asymmetry of bargaining power and access to relevant
information).
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Several scholars have explored the dynamics of trust and relationships in
privacy law. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing
Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 559 (2015)
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processing
restrictions,
enhanced
security
through
privacy-enhancing technologies, reduced identifiability of data sets,
and contextual user privacy controls and settings perform a
complementary role to amplify choice with respect to a consumer’s
data and ongoing choices that may be made.261
The synonymous use of the word “consent” as “choice” has
pervaded new efforts to reconsider privacy models.262 Implicit in this
concept of consent is a temporal linkage, based on the belief that:
(1) notice should occur prior to both soliciting consent and
collecting or using data, and (2) the temporal nexus of notice and
consent to data use (i.e., the closer in time to the transaction in
question), the more informed an individual can be.263
When a relationship is formed through a privacy notice and
consent, it is questionable whether the relationship is based on trust.
As Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog have noted, consent is most
likely to be problematic when it is unwitting,264 coerced,265 or
incapacitated.266 Correspondingly, consent is most likely to be
effective when it is infrequent,267 describes risk vividly,268 and gives
incentives to take each request seriously.269
This Author has similarly observed the challenges with consent
as a procedural mechanism, identifying five key problems, or myths,
surrounding consent as a preferred proxy for choice.270 First, privacy
policies, as contracts of adhesion that do not permit active
the dynamics of trust in privacy law); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 254
(advocating for relational models embodying trust, including foundational
commitments regarding trust in information processing).
261
See Tschider, The Consent Myth, supra note 20, at 1534–35.
262
Id. at 1506, 1516.
263
Id. See Wahlstrom & Fairweather, supra note 255. The Author sees this
change as a responsiveness to Helen Nissenbaum’s considerable writing on the
concept of context and how it shapes our understanding of data collection and use.
See NISSENBAUM, supra note 256.
264
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 20.
265
Id. at 1486.
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Id. at 1490.
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Id. at 1494.
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bargaining and permit organizations to establish terms from a more
powerful position, leave individuals with little choice and often few
alternatives.271 Although one might assume that consumers read the
privacy policy, often a consumer does not have the time to read all
privacy policies all the time, which is a structural limitation.272
When consumers do read the privacy policy, they often cannot
understand what it means in a practical sense because it is
tremendously difficult to describe privacy risk saliently, vividly, and
materially, problems Ryan Calo, Neil Richards and Woodrow
Hartzog, and this Author have advocated to solve.273 Unlike salient
descriptions of, for example, prescription side effects or risks of
participating in clinical trial, describing the risk of data misuse or
data breach and encapsulating the myriad of potential harms using
explanations that are accurate, complete, and written to an
appropriate reading level is tremendously difficult, if not
impossible.274 For this reason, relying completely on disclosures,
and, following, as Daniel Solove dubs “privacy self-management,”
is not likely to promote individual autonomy.275 However, it may
increase how much organizations understand about their own
practices, practices that are exogenous to most consumer
transactions at the point of relationship formation.
Perhaps the most undertheorized and crucial consent problem is
the exogeneity problem, or the inherently hidden and unimaginable
nature of how information is used and flows downstream—what
Daniel Solove deems from the consumer’s perspective “assessing
harms,”276 and what Danielle Keats Citron and Daniel Solove
position as harms that might demonstrate actual injury. Information
271

Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1521.
273
Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012) (describing the need for visceral description or
engagement related to notice, whether in a formal privacy notice or other
notification vehicles). See Richards & Hartzog supra, note 263, at 1463; Tschider,
The Consent Myth, supra, note 20, at 1530 (advocating for clear terms and
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See Tschider, The Consent Myth, supra note 20, at 1522–23.
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about how information is used and flows through systems and to
third parties and third countries is exogeneous because it is not
readily available or understandable from the perspective of a
consumer.
Inherent in this concept is that organizations are making
decisions on behalf of individuals without their knowledge,
resulting in unforeseeable risks unimaginable from the relational
context in which a consumer makes decisions. Information
regarding, for example, system infrastructure, detailed third-party
affiliates and relationships, data flows across systems, and security
approaches are usually considered confidential if not trade secrets,
and therefore are not available to consumers. Furthermore, decisions
about systems and practices are discretionary—they are fully under
the control of an organization and involve cost/benefit analyses and
other strategic organizational decision-making.
Ultimately, these decisions may increase or decrease risk to a
consumer. Examples of such decisions include which third parties
to engage, where to geographically store data, whether systems need
certain upgrades, which security practices to use or not use, and who
will ultimately handle personal consumer information, or a security
framework.277 Even if this information could be shared with
consumers, organizations would encounter challenges succinctly,
completely, and vividly communicating this information to
consumers.278 New technologies only intensify these issues as they
use data continuously and in new and different ways from the
purpose under which data were originally collected.279
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See BAMBAUER ET AL., supra note 147, at 494 (describing the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework as one option for implementing a security model and
making security decisions).
278
See Tschider, The Consent Myth, supra note 20, at 1524. Explaining more
details would extend the length of privacy notices exponentially, and the
complexity of such practices may be tremendously difficult to understand. Indeed,
organizations often negotiate and manage these decisions through their own
contracts and negotiations with vendors, partners, and providers, and frequently
organizational representative themselves do not always understand these
practices. Id.
279
Id. at 1526.
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It is this exogeneity problem, combined with the other existing
consent problems that ultimately makes it tremendously difficult for
consent to mean something in the relational context. Rather than
reinforcing trust, consent erodes it, masquerading as something that
has meaning while being entirely devoid of the salient information
and vulnerabilities which enable trust relationships.280 So how might
this consent problem be solved?
Practices that are necessary to provide a primary good or service
may not actually need consent, as, by definition, the good or service
will not be functional without providing personal information and
using the infrastructure provided. For personal information
collection, use, and retention strictly necessary to provide a service,
usually the risk to an individual is comparatively less, because the
potential risks are less attenuated. Therefore, organizations can
make information available about their practices, as in a highly
salient and layered privacy notice, for example, while also ensuring
such practices are foreseeable and necessary with respect to the good
or service to be provided. Although this scenario does not alleviate
other privacy activities necessary to responsible data handling, such
as security risk assessments on infrastructure and for third party
systems that are part of management-level risk decision-making, it
dramatically curtails abusive data collection and use.
Where more questions remain, however, is when data may be
used for purposes beyond the immediate scope of providing a good
or service, or secondary uses including sales or transmission to third
parties, such as partners or affiliates; product improvement or new
development; marketing or other analytics; and data aggregation and
matching with purchased or public data sets. From the perspective
of a consumer, these types of data uses and collection for these
purposes are not usually directly beneficial.281 Further, these uses
have the potential to be highly coercive and more exogenous to the
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See Waldman, supra note 260, at 83–84.
Privacy Today: A Review of Current Issues, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 1, 2001), https://privacyrights.org/resources/privacytoday-review-current-issues [https://perma.cc/9R7L-RFTU] (showing how issues
that were a problem 20 years ago are still prevalent at the time of this Article’s
writing).
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relationship simply because they are not obvious with respect to the
commercial exchange.282
Part of the challenge in shoe-horning consent into modern data
collection, retention, use, transfer, and sharing models is that these
models may or may not be effective, depending on the nature of data
collection and use.283 For example, perhaps consent is not necessary
when data collected and used are specifically for the service or good
being provided and only used for providing service to that
individual.284 This makes intuitive sense: although a privacy notice
must be available, personal information collection and use should
not be a surprise to a consumer when it is consistent with the service
or goods provided. In that case, the need for consent is largely
extraneous to the model. However, when data are collected and used
in a manner inconsistent with provisioning basic goods and services,
perhaps more is needed.285
Furthermore, completely offloading responsibility to lawmakers
and positioning an organization as receiver of instruction does not
necessarily create internal organizational models where consumer
fairness is inherent in the calculus and decision-making of data
management or where trust is a primary consideration.286 Rather,
facilitating fairness models within organizations should promote
better behaviors while also promoting innovative solutions that
balance data use with individual interests.
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See Tschider, The Consent Myth, supra note 20, at 1528–29.
Id.
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Id.
285
This Author has previously advocated for greater transparency and salience
in bargaining for secondary data use. However, to meet the requirements
necessary may be impossible under some circumstances, such as when the entity
that has collected data no longer has the contact information of an individual
person.
286
It should be noted that the principle of information fiduciary is becoming
increasingly more popular by formalizing the obligations organizations owe
individuals from whom they collect personal information. This Article does not
address this issue specifically but rather seeks to advance discussions around
alternatives to consent which may become part of alternative models like an
information fiduciary relational model. See WALDMAN, supra note 260, at 85–87.
283
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C. Role of the State in Privacy Protection
If individuals acting in their own interests because of the
inherent issues with consent cannot be relied on, what options are
available? Restricting secondary use with positive law may not be
the best answer for these high-context scenarios where exogeneity
is a primary concern. Philosophers like Jürgen Habermas and legal
scholars such as Daniel Solove have criticized the modern “welfare
state,” which results in “overprotection of interests.”287 In privacy
law, this overprotection of interests, or privacy paternalism, reduces
the potential of an individual and collective self-determination.288
Technocracy emerges when individuals cannot influence policy in
line with their own interests.289 The net result of technocracy is a
regime that creates predictability, yet reduces autonomy.290
Superimposing strong mandates often provides predictability while
reducing benefits to all players in the system, including consumers,
who might benefit from low-cost services or enjoy the proceeds of
larger public benefits.291
The result of overprotection and privacy paternalism, then, is
that individuals do not have the opportunity to collectively
self-determine, losing autonomy over decision-making. And
concurrently, paternalistic models do not anticipate an individuals’
choices in the event they actually knew of the potential benefits.292
Instead, these models make assumptions about individuals
collectively, which may or may not be accurate to the group or the
individual, which results in individuals losing autonomy without
much gain. Habermas would instead advocate that the “task of the
state is . . . to encourage a rational debate on conflicting issues,” or
the opportunity for individuals to advocate for their own

287
ERIK O. ERIKSEN & JARLE WEIGÅRD, UNDERSTANDING HABERMAS:
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 154 (2003).
288
Id. See also Solove supra note 274, at 1894.
289
See ERIKSEN & WEIGÅRD, supra note 287, at 154.
290
Id.
291
Solove supra note 20, at 1882.
292
See ERIKSEN & WEIGÅRD, supra note 287, at 154.
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preferences.293 This often takes the form of strategic bargaining,
where strategically operating agents find compromise.294
Habermas fully accepted that the result of the bargain may be
the same (e.g., agents may receive very similar outcomes), but the
process for achieving that outcome could differ.295 Practically
speaking, two different individuals could consent to a particular
privacy disclosure under different circumstances. One person
receives very little information and ultimately consents to receive
the service. Another person is provided enough information to think
through the scenarios and decides to consent, as well. Although the
result is the same, the individuals have vastly different experiences
and the latter may have a more positive relationship with, and even
more trust in, the organization over time. For Habermas, public and
private relationships models, which include multiple discursive
opportunities (not just one) should improve or reinforce individual
autonomy.296 Ultimately, this means that although some
circumstances may require one-sided decision-making for fairness,
individuals should have the ability to intervene or intercede in data
processing activities.297
If the government mandates requirements, instead of advancing
individual autonomy or at least balancing what consumers can
decide and what organizations can do, this introduces other
problems. Consumers will lose individual decision-making and gain
293

Id. at 155.
Id. at 226.
295
Id. For example, one individual could accept all of the terms as initially
presented in a privacy policy and consent to them, including secondary uses.
Another individual could, given the chance, seek to review the various uses in
more detail and consider each use separately. By offering certain inducements,
such as extra services or perks (e.g., a ten percent off coupon), an individual might
agree to roughly the same terms as the other individual, despite different
bargaining processes. The net benefit is choice: individuals could effectively
pursue their own interests.
296
Id. at 154.
297
This seems to suggest that perhaps data collection and use could use a
mechanism other than consent, but that process would need to enhance fairness
while simultaneously promoting individual and responsive decision-making, as in
data subject rights and other user-interface-based controls. See Tschider, The
Consent Myth, supra note 20, at 1534.
294
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predictability, which may reduce available options, while an
organization loses market flexibility and freedom to bargain. An
effective model, even one involving personal information, will
advance autonomy interests by promoting transparency in data
processing, establish predictability to reduce confusion on the part
of organizations and consumers, while simultaneously leaving
organizations some flexibility in their business models and
operations. This type of model is consistent with the history of
consent as a relational model, and often a commercial one.
D. Pursuing Legitimate Interests as Part of a Multi-Dimensional
Privacy System
The beauty of the EU data protection system is not necessarily
in its focus on civil rights, but on the multi-dimensionality of data
protection. There are relational roles between controllers and their
processors, controllers and data subjects, even controllers and
controllers
(sometimes
co-controllers,
sometimes
joint
298
controllers). The EU system embraces the relational model while
also acknowledging that different relationships and different
contexts may demand differing data protection safeguards to protect
the individual rights and freedoms of EU residents.299 For example,
notice and consent is not the only commitment under the GDPR; the
GDPR also requires individual consultation with potential data
subjects about data processing activities.300 Furthermore, amongst
many other obligation, organizations must maintain a register of
their activities, conduct risk assessments on their practices, employ
appropriate security controls, and ensure that data subject rights
requests are honored and fulfilled within a specific time period.301
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See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 35–37.
Id. at 42. The clearest example of options under the GDPR are in lawful
basis for data processing. Further, the GDPR permits risk-based determinations
regarding security. Reg (EU) 2016/679 Recital 66, Art. 32(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119).
Notably, the GDPR contemplates differing contextual scenarios, as in Reg (EU)
2016/679 Art. 6(4), calling for “necessary and proportionate” evaluation.
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Reg (EU) 2016/679 Recital 111, Art. 25(9), 2016 O.J. (L 119).
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Id. Recitals 65, 68, 71, Art. 40, Art. 5, Art. 13, Art. 7, Art. 20, Art. 21, Art.
17, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
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Woodrow Hartzog has promoted dynamic privacy practices
from a U.S. perspective, advocating for better privacy design
appropriate to specific technologies, acknowledging the differing
user interfaces (if they exist) and context users might experience.302
Dr. Ann Cavoukian, Information & Privacy Commissioner for
Canada’s Ontario Province, created the Privacy by Design approach
in the 1990s, acknowledging that building privacy into products and
systems enabled better, more proactive privacy management that
honored the experiences of actual individuals.303 Privacy by Design
is now encouraged formally as part of the GDPR, and organizations
across the world have begun building privacy considerations into
their products.304
An important question is whether consent is still useful in more
contextual, contemplative models, or whether heavily relying on
notice and consent promotes a false sense of trust and ultimately
does more harm than good, like putting a glossy coat on a car that
does not start.305 The EU offers a useful model for alternatives to
consent, which may advance conversations related to contextual
privacy decision-making in-line with product-based design and
complex technology implementations.306 Specifically, the Article 29
Working Party recognized that certain requirements could be offset
or bolstered with other more rigorous privacy protections. For
example, extensive use of anonymization techniques, increased
transparency, and more accessible opt-out models could offset more
indirect lawful bases, such as relying on legitimate interest analysis
rather than explicit consent.307 Although it is important to recognize
that consent is still an important part of EU data protection law, even
302

See generally WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT THE BATTLE TO
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privacy to be built into products rather than regulated as separate activities).
303
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See Tschider, Regulating, supra note 18.
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See Opinion of the Working Party, supra note 222, at 41–42; Reg (EU)
2016/679 Art. 6(4), 2016 O.J. (L 119).

MAY 2021]

Meaningful Choice

677

though some limits on consent render it slightly better than the U.S.
model, consent is not designed to be effective in every context.308
E. How the EU’s Lawful Bases Can Influence U.S. Conceptions of
Consent and Advance Privacy
The Article 29 Working Party’s 2014 Legitimate Interest
opinion offers a model that could be included in privacy laws, or at
the very least recognized as an alternative to consent under the
FTC’s FIPPs. If combined with consultation from representative
consumers, legitimate interest balancing could require organizations
to analyze scenarios from the perspective of a consumer, blending
legitimate interest with some contextual input. This is properly
employed when an organization desires personal information
collection and use for secondary uses that may pose some risk of
harm to the consumer.
The Working Party’s document offers an outline for assessing
interests that would be useful for an organization’s documented risk
analysis,309 not markedly different from privacy and security
assessments many organizations already complete. This model has
been supplemented and summarized for purposes of rendering a
trust-based, relational legitimate interest model:
1. Assessment of Impact: Determine the positive and negative
consequences of processing on an individual person or class
of people. Assessment includes impacts from third parties on
decisions that may affect the individual; probability of
discrimination, defamation, or social harms; or when
reputation, negotiating power, or autonomy may be
damaged. Such assessment should take into account
cumulative impacts of these consequences holistically.310
Likelihood of risk materializing, and severity of the

308
See supra, Part II and accompanying notes. One key difference is consent in
the EU usually has additional requirements, such as explicitness,
unambiguousness, and especially non-coerciveness. Consent must be freely
given, which means additional data processing beyond the primary purposes for
which data are collected must be separately consented.
309
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310
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consequences (Impact) are key to determining impact in this
assessment.311
Nature of the Data: Determine what inherent risk certain data
types have and, for example, what level of identifiability
data sets provide, especially in big data forms or for
databases feeding artificial intelligence systems. Biometrics,
for example, might pose more risk due to their indelibility.
Location data might pose more risk due to the connection
with physical safety.
The Way Data Are Planned to Be Processed: Determine
what the planned processing will look like, specifically the
number and character of potential recipients, the need for
reuse and access to data by a larger number of people who
are disconnected from the original processing purposes.
Consider, as well, security practices which may offer
additional protections from unauthorized disclosure.
Reasonable Expectations of the Consumer: Consider
expected behavior on the part of the organization from the
perspective of the individual or consumer. Determine the
range of behaviors that would have been relationally
consistent with information previously disclosed (including
the context of data collection), the nature of the relationship,
and the need to enhance trust within the relationship. Engage
with representative consumers to weigh-in on the value of
such benefits to the individual, group, or community in a
focus group or similar.
Status of the Organization and the Individual or Consumer:
Observe potential relational differences in bargaining power
and forced trust. Consider whether an individual’s positional
power might coerce individuals to make decisions they
otherwise would not make. Relational differences should
also be analyzed for specific groups, communities, and age
groups where bargaining power might be even more
diminished or the likelihood of coercion is high, such as

Id. at 38.
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provisioning healthcare or qualifying for entitlement
programs.
6. Publish Results of Legitimate Interest Analysis: To reinforce
transparency, organizations must be required to publish this
analysis when they rely on it for secondary data processing,
in addition to privacy notices already required under state
laws. The analysis need not disclose confidential details but
offer enough information to demonstrate, to consumers and
regulators, that benefits to consumers outweigh benefits to
the organizations. Such an analysis must be repeated when
material terms regarding data collection and use change, as
is required for posting privacy policies.
The question, though, is how a legitimate interest model like this
could be implemented. First, legitimate interest could be voluntarily
employed by ethically minded organizations as a limiting factor for
further data processing, as in secondary use. With this model,
organizations would rely on consent, but would validate their use
after the fact. Of course, this model lacks the teeth often needed to
change behavior, though organizations wishing to promote
themselves as ethically minded could use this model to demonstrate
it.
Second, legitimate interest could be positioned as a replacement
for consent related to secondary uses, or required in addition to
consent under the FIPPs, or used as a framework for the FTC’s
UDAP enforcement. Legitimate interest could formally be included
in administrative laws like HIPAA either by enforcement discretion
when there is no private right of action, or in new rewrites of privacy
laws at the state and federal level. A legitimate interest analysis is
an easy additional requirement consistent with privacy policy
disclosure requirements currently required under many privacy
laws. In fact, such an analysis could easily be included in a privacy
policy if need be.
Finally, courts could use legitimate interest analysis as a factorbased inquiry for common-law privacy actions to assist in
determining the likelihood of privacy harms at the time data were
collected and used, as well as countervailing benefits anticipated.
For breach of contract actions, for example, a lack of legitimate

680

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 617

interest analysis could be persuasive for courts finding
unconscionability in the contracting process. In the event courts
recognize alternative forms of injury or when states draft new
privacy statutes, like the California Consumer Privacy Act, they will
need a model for determining whether an organization performed
appropriately with respect to individuals. Without a contextual and
relational model for evaluation, ethical organizations may
experience unfavorable results, while unethical organizations
emerge unscathed. A legitimate interest balancing exercise may
provide useful information for determining which organizations are
indeed blameworthy. In the event an information fiduciary model
becomes commonplace, legitimate interest analysis could also
provide a true risk-based analysis that takes into account the
relationship, justified expectations, and potential privacy harms.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article only scratches the surface of how legitimate interest
analysis could be adopted within the United States. Indeed, the EU
still has not developed a detailed model for practically completing
this analysis, which illustrates its complexity. In line with recent
scholarly discussions of relational privacy, privacy by design, trust,
and fiduciary relationships, however, the United States should
consider more effective models for negotiating relational and
contractual relationships. By assessing actual risks to individuals,
organizations have the ability to forge effective, trustworthy, and
long-term relationships while simultaneously gaining more
flexibility in data collection without the challenges and
ineffectiveness of consent. The new world is a world with both data
and privacy.

